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CALIFORNIA DENTAL ASSOCIATION:
NOT A QUICK LOOK BUT NOT THE FULL MONTY
STEPHEN CALKINS*
Some cases can be understood only in context. Law students are taught
to distinguish holdings from dictum, but lawyers and judges alike need
regular refresher courses on this fundamental point. Facts and outcomes,
not judicial phrasings, make the law. To understand some cases fully
requires knowing more than the facts and the outcome; it requires
knowing what the case was really about-what issues were presented to
appellate courts, what arguments were persuasive, and, sometimes most
especially, what arguments failed to carry the day.
California Dental Association v. FTC' is a case that singularly illustrates
these observations. More than most opinions, CDA can be understood
only in context. The story of the CDA litigation is essential to an under-
standing of the Court's opinion. That story also teaches valuable lessons
about administrative and appellate adjudication, and helps to explain
how the Supreme Court could write such a disappointing opinion.
Three issues were vigorously contested in CDA. The first issue con-
cerned the FTC'sjurisdiction over nonprofit associations. An FTC defeat
on this issue would have had serious consequences for the Commission,
but the FTC prevailed on terms even more favorable than it had sought.
The Supreme Court has now shined a powerful spotlight on the anticom-
petitive potential of these associations.
The second issue concerned the place in antitrust of the full-blown
rule of reason. Here the question was whether conduct short of classic
per se violations can be condemned without formal proof of market
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. The author was General Counsel
of the Federal Trade Commission when the case that is the subject of this article was
decided and when it was successfully defended on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. However,
the views expressed herein are entirely his own, have not been approved by the FTC, and
do not represent the views of the FTC or any Commissioner. This article is based entirely
on publicly available information and necessarily does not discuss the author's role in any
of the decisions herein appraised.
1 119 S. Ct. 1604 (1999) (CDA).
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power, complete with market definitions, economics testimony, measure-
ment of entry conditions, and the like-the antitrust Full Monty.2 Here,
too, an FTC defeat would have had serious consequences, not just for
the Commission but for all of antitrust; but the FTC prevailed. (To be
sure, the Supreme Court disapproved of the way it believed the Ninth
Circuit had applied "quick look" antitrust review, but the Court
remanded for further proceedings without calling for full-blown rule of
reason review.)
The third issue concerned professional advertising and the hostility
with which regulators should view industry self-regulation. On this issue
only, the FTC lost. That defeat has sent the Commission back to rethink
professional advertising and to reexamine the empirical evidence of the
effect of self-regulation in CDA. The defeat is a vivid reminder of the
discomfort with which several members of the Supreme Court view
professional advertising. Contrary to the views of some commentators,
however, it teaches little about more general antitrust issues.
The story of CDA and the lessons that can be drawn from it are
unusually complicated. To examine them, this article sketches an over-
view of the dispute at issue and the various opinions, and then turns to
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court here adopted a nebulous standard
more aggressive than that used or advanced by the Commission, all the
while claiming that it was following the Commission's views. The article
then examines the antipathy to professional advertising evinced by the
Court majority. The Court lent a sympathetic ear to arguments that had
not been advanced below and that are not likely to prove persuasive in
a different context.
The most important lesson of CDA is that the defendant's 3 principal
argument throughout the proceeding-that the Commission could pro-
hibit its restraints only through elaborate, formal proof of market
power-was rejected. As context, the article reviews the origin and deriva-
tion of the flexible rule of reason. It shows that CDA is a setback for
what could be known as the "quick look movement," but also is a setback
2See London Slang <http://www.geezer.demon.co.uk> ("full monty-'the whole lot,' 'all
that is desired.' There are a few meanings proposed for the phrase 'the full monty,' but
the most commonly accepted one is that it comes from a gambling term where the 'monte'
(Spanish for mountain) is the kitty or 'pot' of money in the middle of the table. This has
been changed to the spelling 'monty."'); A Dictionary of Slang <http://www.peevish
.u-net.com/slang/f.htm> ("The complete amount. The Monty can possibly be spelt with
a capital M."). Thanks to Charles Lister for directing me away from the delightful film to
these authorities.
3The party against whom an FTC administrative complaint is filed is known as a
"respondent," but for ease of reading, this article will use the more familiar term,
"defendant."
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for market power screens. Finally, the article applauds CDA's call for
application of a "sliding scale" of antitrust analysis. The CDA litigation
itself exemplifies some of the problems associated with alternative
approaches, including categorizations, such as "inherently suspect,"
"non-naked restraints," "quick looks," "facially suspect," and "plausible
efficiencies." The article ends with preliminary thoughts about applying
a sliding scale of antitrust analysis.
I. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. THE CDA DISPUTE
As summarized by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit (on whose recitation the Court relied), CDA's facts have a
surface straightforwardness. CDA is a voluntary, nonprofit association to
which approximately 75 percent of California's practicing dentists belong.
All members agree to abide by a Code of Ethics that, among other things,
requires dentists to "represent themselves in a manner that contributes
to the esteem of the public" and prohibits "false or misleading" advertis-
ing.4 This Code has been supplemented by advisory opinions5 and guide-
Section 10 of the Code is as follows:
Although any dentist may advertise, no dentist shall advertise or solicit patients
in any form of communication in a manner that is false or misleading in any
material respect. In order to properly serve the public, dentists should represent
themselves in a manner that contributes to the esteem of the public. Dentists
should not misrepresent their training and competence in any way that would
be false or misleading in any material respect.
California Dental Ass'n v. FrC, 128 F.3d 720, 723 (9th Cir. 1997); 119 S. Ct. at 1608.
The CDAJudicial Council may issue advisory opinions setting forth its interpretations
of the Code's principles. Although not binding interpretations, the opinions "'may be
considered as persuasive by the trial body and any disciplinary proceedings under the
CDA Bylaws.'" 128 F.3d at 723 n.1 (quoting the preamble to the Code).
Among issued advisory opinions relating to advertising are the following:
2. A statement or claim is false or misleading in any material respect when it:
a. contains a misrepresentation of fact;
b. is likely to mislead or deceive because in context it makes only a partial
disclosure of relevant facts;
c. is intended or is likely to create false or unjustified expectations of favorable
results and/or costs;
d. relates to fees for specific types of services without fully and specifically disclos-
ing all variables and other relevant factors;
e. contains other representations or implications that in reasonable probability
will cause an ordinarily prudent person to misunderstand or be deceived.
3. Any communication or advertisement which refers to the cost of dental services
shall be exact, without omissions, and shall make each service clearly identifiable,
without the use of such phrases as "as low as," "and up," "lowest prices," or words
or phrases of similar import.
4. Any advertisement which refers to the cost of dental services and uses words
of comparison or relativity-for example, "low fees"--must be based on verifiable
20001
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lines. 6 The Commission's challenge alleged that, as interpreted and
enforced, CDA's advertising restrictions had the effect of substantially
chilling price and quality advertising, to the detriment of consumers.
B. THE INITIAL DECISION
The Commission's complaint, issued unanimously on July 9, 1993,7
seemed simple enough. It alleged that the CDA, which included "approxi-
mately 75% of the practicing dentists in California," had restricted its
members' advertising of prices and quality, "without regard to whether
such advertising is truthful and nondeceptive." 8 The complaint alleged
that these restrictions "had, or have, the tendency and capacity to restrain
competition unreasonably and to injure consumers" by depriving con-
sumers of information, raising consumer costs, and lessening innova-
tion. 9 The agreed-to restrictions allegedly violated Section 5 of the FTC
Act.1° No mention was made of market power.
A year and a half of discovery led up to a two-week trial."1 Almost exactly
two years after the complaint was issued, now-retired Administrative Law
data substantiating the comparison or statement of relativity. The burden shall
be on the dentist who advertises in such terms to establish the accuracy of the
comparison or statement of relativity.
8. Advertising claims as to the quality of services are not susceptible to measure-
ment or verification; accordingly, such claims are likely to be false or misleading
in any material respect.
Id. at 723-24 (quoted at 119 S. Ct. at 1608 n.1).
" According to the court of appeals, CDA's advertising guidelines declare that California
state law "requires dentists offering discounts to list all of the following in the advertisement:
1. The dollar amount of the nondiscounted fee for the service;
2. Either the dollar amount of the discount fee or the percentage of the discount
for the specific service;
3. The length of time that the discount will be offered;
4. Verifiable fees; and
5. Specific groups who qualify for the discount or any other terms and conditions
or restrictions for qualifying for the discount."
128 F.3d at 724 (quoted at 119 S. Ct. at 1608 n.2).
7 121 F.T.C. 190,190 (1996); seeNews and Comment, Antitrust&Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 99
(1993). Chairman Steiger wasjoined by Commissioners Azcuenaga (the only independent),
Owen, Starek, and Yao (the only Democrat). 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 9562, at 16,451-52
(June 24, 1998) (Commissioner terms). The complaint was the result of an investigation
that had started much earlier. See Brief of Petitioner California Dental Ass'n in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at 5 n.3 (investigation began in 1985)
[hereinafter CDA Ninth Circuit Brief].
I Complaint 2, 9, California Dental Ass'n, 121 F.T.C. 190 (1996).
9 Id. 11.
10 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) ("Unfair methods of competition .... and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.").
11 121 F.T.C. at 195 (initial decision).
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Judge Lewis Parker issued an eighty-page Initial Decision that found
that CDA had violated Section 5. Judge Parker's opinion employed the
Commission's unique Mass. Board structured antitrust analysis12 to the
exclusion of any other approach. Thus, the "Conclusions of Law" use
Mass. Board terms and declare first that "the restrictions are inherently
suspect" and then that "the restrictions are notjustified."I The opinion's
affirmative case for finding a violation includes no discussion of the
conventional rule of reason or, indeed, of any judicial antitrust opinion.
Instead, there are two simple findings: suspectness and lack of justifi-
cation.14
Judge Parker's finding of a Section 5 violation appends to suspectness
and lack of justification an odd third subheading: "CDA's members do
not have market power."' 5 Judge Parker briefly (one page) discusses
12 Massachusetts Board of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549 (1988); see infra
text at note 158.
1' 121 F.T.C. at 268, 270.
14Judge Parker's Initial Decision is one of those old-fashioned opinions with endless
numbered "findings of fact" followed by a much more abbreviated narrative comprising
its "conclusions of law." This structure invited mischief. The 65 pages of "findings of fact"
lent an air of thoroughness to the case, even though some factual issues that were later
to be of interest to the Supreme Court had not been addressed. The 331 numbered
"findings of fact" freely mix substantive declarations of market facts with simple recitation
of trial episodes. Given the length of the decision, there are many examples of each.
Factual conclusions address a variety of important issues. E.g., Finding 282: "From 1982
until 1993, CDA and its components have challenged hundreds of advertising representa-
tions which on their face are not false or deceptive.... Many dentists, whose advertising
was challenged, agreed to modify it ..." Even more "findings" simply recorded testimony,
the way any reporter might. E.g., Finding 179: "Dr. Miley... testified .... ; Finding 180:
"Dr. Kinney... testified .... ; Finding 181: "Dr. Cowan ... testified ...."
Significantly, the listed "Findings of Fact" on "Economic Analysis" are almost exclusively
reportorial. Particularly problematic, as subsequent developments would show, were two
"Findings of Fact" that recited the testimony of defense economist Robert Knox:
322. Professor Knox testified that CDA's enforcement of its Code of Ethics
with respect to advertising has no negative impact on competition in any dental
market in California because it cannot erect any barriers to entry (i.e., an advan-
tage which existing firms have over potential entrants) into any dental market
in California (Tr. 1633).
326. Professor Knox concluded that even if CDA occasionally questions mem-
ber advertisements which are not false or misleading in a material respect: "the
activities of the California Dental Association with respect to their enforcement
of their Code of Ethics relative to advertising has no impact on competition in
any market in the State of California, particularly with respect to price and
output" (Tr. 1640).
121 F.T.C. at 260; see also id. Finding 324 (Knox testified that scrutiny of dental advertising
is procompetitive because false advertising harms competition).
11 121 F.T.C. at 272. Judge Parker appears to have based this conclusion on his belief
that any "problems experienced by dentists in opening a practice in California ... do not
pose an insurmountable obstacle to entry." Id. (citing James A. Langenfeld & John R.
2000]
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CDA's lack of market power, declares that this lack of market power
means that CDA's restraints would be lawful under the rule of reason,
but then summarily indicates that neither lack of market power nor
failure to satisfy the rule of reason should prevent Complaint Counsel
from prevailing. 16 In other words, Judge Parker first discussed market
power and, after finding it absent, said that market power was irrelevant.
Judge Parker concluded that "CDA's acts and practices unreasonably
restrain competition .... ,,17
C. THE COMMISSION
On appeal from the Initial Decision, the Commission found a violation
and entered an order. 18 The heart of Chairman Pitofsky's quite strong
opinion for the Commission-Part V-begins with a panegyric on the
role of advertising in a competitive market system. Truthful advertising
can inform consumers, lower prices, reduce entry barriers, and improve
quality, wrote the Commission; and "[r] estraints on truthful advertising
for professional services are inherently likely to produce anticompeti-
tive effects."' 9
The Commission found and then condemned the price restraints as
per se illegal and the price and non-price restraints under a rule of
reason whose application, the Commission said, was "simple and short. 20
The Commission wrote that it was taking a "'quick look under the
Morris, Analyzing Agreements Among Corporations: What Does the Future Hold?, 36 ANTITRUST
BULL. 651, 677 (1991), which observed that entry prevents supracompetitive pricing).
16 121 F.T.C. at 273: ("[T]he failure to establish the conditions for satisfaction of a Rule
of Reason analysis is not fatal. See Mass. Board, 110 F.T.C. at 602 n.8: 'The Court [in FFC
v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986)] rejected the dentists' argument that
the Commission erred in not making elaborate market power determinations.... '). To
this language Judge Parker appended a cryptic footnote: " 'Substantial market power is
an essential ingredient of every antitrust case under the Rule of Reason,' Sanjuan v.
American Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994)."
17 121 F.T.C. at 273.
11 Commissioner Starek filed a concurring opinion that disagreed only with the Commis-
sion's framework for analyzing the restraints. Commissioner Azcuenaga dissented from
the finding of a substantive violation.
19 121 F.T.C. at 296-97 (quoting Mass. Board, 110 F.T.C. at 605).
20 121 F.T.C. at 308 ("The Supreme Court has made clear that the rule of reason
contemplates a flexible inquiry, examining a challenged restraint in the detail necessary
to understand its competitive effect. As will be seen, here, application of the rule of reason
is simple and short.") (citations omitted). Although the Commission used the per se and
rule of reason categories rather than the Mass. Board series of questions, see infra text
accompanying note 158, it wrote that the result it reached was "not inconsistent" with its
Mass. Board decision. Id. at 321 & n.26.
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rule of reason."' 2 The Commission found that CDA had "effectively
precluded advertising that characterized a dentist's fees as being low,
reasonable, or affordable, as well as advertising of across-the-board dis-
counts."22 Significantly, in light of the Supreme Court's later analysis,
the Commission also found that CDA's program did not lead to the
advertising of across-the-board discounts that included detailed itemiza-
tion of particular fees. 23 The Commission did not make findings on
whether or not CDA dentists advertised other discounts, likely because
no one had made a serious argument that CDA dentists engaged in
such advertising.
With respect to non-price advertising, the Commission concluded that
"[i]n practice, CDA prohibits all quality claims." 24 This was likely anticom-
petitive, according to the Commission, for the reasons given when it
discussed the importance of advertising. The Commission concluded
that "the restraints hamper dentists in their ability to attract patients...
and thereby are likely to reduce output," and they "deprive consumers of
information they value and of healthy competition for their patronage.
25
The Commission examined market power and found that CDA had
sufficient power to impose its restrictions on its members and to withhold
information successfully from consumers. As part of this analysis, the
Commission considered CDA's market share (75 percent of practicing
dentists) and entry conditions (it found entry to be difficult).26 Finally,
the Commission reviewed possible efficiencies and found them lacking.
It considered the analogy to Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,27 where the
Court had expressed concern that advertisements of professional services
might be unusually misleading. The Commission's response was that
more recent Supreme Court opinions evince more "faith that the free
21 Id. at 316 ("As the third step in our quick look, we examine the efficiency
justifications .... ); id. at 320 ("As our quick look under the rule of reason reveals, the
advertising restrictions are likely to have anticompetitive effects.").
22 Id. at 301.
23 Id. at 302.
24 Id. at 308.
25 Id. at 311.
26 The Commission correctly observed that it has never been held, as Judge Parker
appears to have believed, that only "insurmountable" entry barriers are cognizable in
antitrust analysis. Id. at 315.
27 433 U.S. 350, 383-84 (1977) ("[B]ecause the public lacks sophistication concerning
legal services, misstatements that might be over-looked or deemed unimportant in other
advertising may be found quite inappropriate in legal advertising. For example, advertising
claims as to the quality of services-a matter we do not address today-are not susceptible
of measurement or verification; accordingly, such claims may be so likely to be misleading
as to warrant restriction.").
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flow of commercial information is valuable;"2 that quality claims should
not be broadly prohibited without some effort to determine their accu-
racy; and that "CDA has offered no convincing argument, let alone
evidence, that consumers of dental services have been, or are likely to
be, harmed by the broad categories of advertising it restricts."29
The Commission majority was strongly attacked by Commissioner
Azcuenaga, who issued a thirty-page dissent.30 In part she took up CDA's
theme, and argued that all was lawful because market power had not
been shown. In part she condemned the leaving behind of Mass. Board
and what she said was unjustified application of the per se rule. Most
of her remarkably long, detailed dissent consists of a fine-toothed review
of the evidence and a disagreement with the majority's fact finding.31
D. THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In the Ninth Circuit, CDA successfully assaulted the Commission's
invocation of the per se rule, but otherwise it persuaded only Judge
Real. Judge Real, who wrote a dissenting opinion, favored CDA's position
on jurisdiction and on the merits. On the merits, he said that "a full
market power analysis" should have been conducted because CDA did
not engage in "any naked restraints." 32 He concluded that CDA was
merely seeking to prevent "misleading or unreliable advertising," and it
"does not in any way infringe upon the rights of any member to advertise
providing the advertising is not 'false or misleading in any material
respect.' -31
18 121 F.T.C. at 318 (quoting Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 478 (1988)
(quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 646 (1985))).
29 121 F.T.C. at 319-20 (citation to Initial Decision omitted).
'10 For a contemporaneous criticism of the Commission's CDA opinion, seeJoseph Kattan,
The Role of Efficiency Considerations in the Federal Trade Commission's Antitrust Analysis, 64
ANTITRUST L.J. 613 (1996).
11 Commissioner Azcuenaga asserted that Complaint Counsel had failed factually to
prove its case, in part because they and Judge Parker had assumed that actions of local
chapters were attributable to CDA, whereas the Commission had not found this, and,
accordingly, had conducted an independent review of the record. 121 F.T.C. at 337. She
asserted that "there is no empirical evidence in the record that CDA members advertise
less frequently than dentists in California who are not members of CDA or that dentists
in California advertise less than dentists in other states." Id. at 338; see also id. at 339
("the record suggests that CDA has not deterred dentists in California from advertising").
Commissioner Azcuenaga questioned "whether the record provides a sufficient basis to
find that CDA prohibits price advertising," id., and said that more fact finding and reflection
was needed before CDA's non-price advertising restraints were condemned.
32 128 F.3d at 731.
33 Id. (quoting CDA's Code of Ethics).
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The majority, in an opinion by Judge Hall, disagreed. It tried to
separate issues of law, which are reviewed de novo but with some defer-
ence, from "findings of fact and economic conclusions," which are evalu-
ated "under the substantial evidence standard." 34 It saw application of
an abbreviated rule of reason as an issue of law. The Commission appro-
priately used this method of analyzing CDA's restrictions on price adver-
tising, the court reasoned, because CDA'sjustification-"preventing false
and misleading price advertising"-did not "require[] more than a quick
look under the rule of reason" because in practice CDA prohibited all
across-the-board discounts.35 "Indeed, the record provides no evidence
that the rule has in fact led to increased disclosure and transparency of
dental prices." 36 For nonprice advertising, a "quick look rule of reason
analysis" also was appropriate, among other reasons because any concern
that such advertising may be misleading "does not justify banning all
quality claims, without regard to whether they are, in fact, false or mis-
leading." 37
Having found that abbreviated analysis was appropriate, the court then
found that substantial evidence supported the Commission's findings
that CDA "prohibit[ed] ads that were in fact true and nondeceptive"
and that "CDA restricted nonprice advertising without any particular
consideration of whether it was true or false." 8 "Given the facially anti-
competitive nature of both the price and nonprice advertising restric-
tions, the evidence of the CDA's large market share and influence justifies
finding a violation under the quick look rule of reason. ' 39 The court
affirmed the Commission's decision and enforced its order.
E. THE SUPREME COURT
The 2-1 division in the Ninth Circuit, in part on an issue (jurisdiction)
on which the Supreme Court had split when it was presented in 1982,40
s Id. at 725.
s Id. at 728.
56 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 729.
59 Id. at 730. The Ninth Circuit also relied upon Professor Hovenkamp's commentary
on the Commission's CDA opinion to reason that restricting information was itself "a form
of output limitation." Id. at 728 (citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRusT LAw 693-94 (Supp. 1997). Professor Hovenkamp had even wondered "whether
the horizontal restrictions on non-price advertising really merited rule of reason treatment
at all." ARREDA & HOVENKAMP, supra, at 693.
40 See American Med. Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701, 983 (1979), affJd by an equally divided Court,
455 U.S. 676 (1982).
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set up CDA's successful petition for certiorari. 41 The Supreme Court
unanimously agreed with the finding of jurisdiction. By a vote of 5-4,
however, it ruled that the Ninth Circuit had applied too quick a look,
and it vacated the judgment and remanded the case.
Justice Souter's opinion for the Court is an enigma. The Court held
that the Ninth Circuit "erred when it held as a matter of law that quick-
look analysis was appropriate (with the consequence that the Commis-
sion's abbreviated analysis and conclusion were sustainable) .'42 The
Court viewed this as a threshold legal decision, and thus it did not
"reach the question of the substantiality of the evidence supporting the
Commission's conclusion."4 3 In the end, however, the Court did not rule
that CDA's restraints were lawful or even that they should be judged
under the full-blown rule of reason. Rather, the Court simply said that
the justifications that CDA presented were sufficiently substantive that
If]or now, at least, a less quick look was required for the initial assessment
of the [alleged anticompetitive] tendency of these professional advertis-
ing restrictions."4 The Court vacated the judgment and remanded "for
a fuller consideration of the issue." 45
Beyond the resolution of this particular dispute, CDA may enjoy a
lengthy career as the Supreme Court's latest word on fundamentally
41 CDA's "Questions Presented" were as follows:
The Federal Trade Commission ... alleg[ed] that the California Dental Associa-
tion ("CDA"), a non-profit professional association, violated Section 5 ... by
prohibiting member dentists... from engaging in false or misleading advertising.
Despite the finding by the Administrative LawJudge that CDA's enforcement of
its Code of Ethics "has no negative impact on competition," the Commission
and the Court of Appeals held that CDA violated the antitrust laws. The two
basic questions presented by this petition are:
1 1. Whether the Commission hasjurisdiction over nonprofit professional associa-
tions.
2. Whether a nonprofit professional association violates the antitrust laws under
the rule of reason when its advertising disclosure requirements are animated by
procompetitive purposes, do not directly affect price or output, and have no
negative impact on competition.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 119 S. Ct. 1604 (1999)
(No. 97-1625).
412 119 S. Ct. at 1612.
43 Id.
14 Id. at 1618.
45 Id. It left for the court of appeals whether or not to remand the case to the Commission
"for a more extensive rule-of-reason analysis on the basis of an enhanced record." Id. at
1612 n.8. More than two months after the Court's decision, the FTC moved for remand.
Motion of Respondent Federal Trade Commission for Remand, California Dental Ass'n
v. FTC, No. 96-70409 (9th Cir. filedJuly 29,1999). After receiving CDA's response opposing
remand, and an FTC reply, the Ninth Circuit denied the FTC's request.
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important questions about antitrust laws' rule of reason.4 6 New and not
altogether mellifluous words have been added to the antitrust vocabulary
("an enquiry meet for the case;" how confident can one be "from a
quick (or at least quicker) look, in place of a more sedulous one").47
Commentators have and will read a variety of messages into the Court's
Delphic phrases.
Justice Breyer, writing for four Justices, wrote such a powerful and
persuasive dissenting opinion that one has to wonder whyJustice Souter,
who is often regarded as a swing vote, did not join it. Indeed, Justice
Souter for the Court came close to saying that had the Ninth Circuit
authored Justice Breyer's opinion, the Court would have affirmed.48
Justice Breyer's stature as an antitrust expert makes it likely that his
opinion will be consulted with unusual frequency.49
II. JURISDICTION
The jurisdictional issue turned out even worse for CDA and its amici
on this issue than they could have imagined. The FTC was affirmed on
a more aggressive theory than the agency had previously adopted, and
the spotlight of Supreme Court attention was turned onto the potential
competitive abuses one can expect from associations.
Up until oral argument, the jurisdictional question had played quite
well for CDA. The issue was how to interpret language in the FTC Act
that conferred that agency with jurisdiction over "persons, partnerships,
or corporations, '"50 and that, oddly enough, defined "corporation"
broadly to include "any company ... or association, incorporated or
unincorporated, . . . which is organized to carry on business for its own
profit or that of its members." 51 After the FTC found jurisdiction, invok-
ing its usual test that looks to whether the association "confers pecuniary
46 The Court's most recent analysis of per se/rule of reason issues was in Palmer v. BRG
of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (per curiam) (horizontal division of markets between
potential competitors is per se illegal).
47 119 S. Ct. at 1618.
11 Id. at 1617 ("Had the Court of Appeals engaged in a painstaking discussion in a
league with Justice Breyer's (compare his 14 pages with the Ninth Circuit's 8), and had
it confronted the comparability of these restrictions to bars on clearly verifiable advertising,
its reasoning might have sufficed to justify its conclusion. Certainly Justice Breyer's treat-
ment of the antitrust issues here is no 'quick look.' ").
19 For an antitrust decision for which a non-majority opinion (a concurrence in the
judgment) is regularly cited, see Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,
32 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (with Burger, Ch. J., and Powell
& Rehnquist, J.J.).
50 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2).
51 15 U.S.C. § 44.
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benefits upon its members as a substantial part of its activities,"5 2 the
Ninth Circuit affirmed but recognized a Circuit split. This set up CDA
to file a petition for certiorari that led with this issue. Several amici
joined CDA in urging the Court to address the issue and divest the FTC
of jurisdiction over nonprofit professional associations.
The situation turned bleak for CDA and its allies at oral argument.
CDA's counsel was pelted with questions from Justices questioning CDA's
recommended test (whether the association earns more revenue that its
expenses and pays out shares of that net "profit"). When counsel pointed
to its favorite case, Community Blood Bank of the Kansas City Area, Inc. v.
FTC,5" Justice Breyer dismissed that as a lower court opinion, and said
that he "would have thought it [the statutory distinction] was designed
to distinguish trade associations from charities." 54 When counsel insisted
that it was essential that the association earn a profit, a Justice pointedly
asked, "Were organizations like the Cement Institute,55 the Sugar Insti-
tute,56 the Maple Flooring Association 57-were they themselves making
a profit? I doubt it."58 When counsel noted that it was not seeking an
exemption from the antitrust laws, just a denial of FTC jurisdiction,
Justice Stevens noted that advertising, such as was at issue here, was
typically an FTC responsibility. Another Justice astringently noted that
some trade associations, "as some in our sorry history of antitrust laws
have in the past done, are engaged in price fixing. '59 Finally, a Justice
asked for the difference between CDA and the associations previously
mentioned, if one were to assume that they did not book a profit. Counsel
responded, "We have a public purpose. We promote the art and science
of dentistry." TheJustice rejoined, "Well, I believe Maple Flooring would
have promoted the art and science of maple flooring. It's beautiful,
you know, aesthetically attractive, and so forth."6° Counsel moved on to
the merits.
The final result was worse for CDA and other professional associations
than if CDA had never sought certiorari. Before CDA sought certiorari,
52 121 F.T.C. at 290.
53405 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1969).
54 Transcript of Argument Before the Supreme Court at 8, California Dental Ass'n v.
FTC, 119 S. Ct. 1604 (1999) (No. 97-1625) [hereinafter Supreme Court Transcript]. All
references to particular Justices are based on eyewitness accounts, because the Court
transcript does not identify the Justice asking a question.
55 Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
16 Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
57 Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
51 Supreme Court Transcript, supra note 54, at 10.
59 Id. at 13.
l0 Id. at 17.
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associations could say that the circuits were split and the Court was
divided. Now, a unanimous Supreme Court has spoken. As part of its
discussion, it highlighted the anticompetitive potential of nonprofit asso-
ciations:
Nonprofit entities organized on behalf of for-profit members have the
same capacity and derivatively, at least, the same incentives as for-
profit organizations to engage in unfair methods of competition or
unfair or deceptive acts. It may even be possible that a nonprofit entity
up to no good would have certain advantages ... over a for-profit
membership organization...; it would enjoy the screen of superficial
disinterest .... 61
Comments during oral argument, as noted above, also suggest consider-
able skepticism about the likelihood that associations can be trusted to
protect the public interest.
The truly surprising wrinkle is the Court's adoption of a more expan-
sive jurisdictional test than even the Commission had employed. The
Commission applied its customary substantiality test to the activities of
CDA: "[T [he Commission can 'assert jurisdiction over nonprofit organi-
zations whose activities engender a pecuniary benefit to its members if
[those] activit[ies are] a substantial part of the total activities of the
organization, rather than merely incidental to some non-commercial
activity." 62 The Ninth Circuit accurately enunciated this test and approved
the Commission's use of it.63 The Solicitor General (SG) also accurately
described the Commission's "substantial part of the total activities" test
and defended the agency's use of it, going so far as to ask for Chevron
deference. 64 However, the SG also wrote descriptively about the FTC's
61 119 S. Ct. at 1611-12.
62 121 F.T.C. at 289 (quoting American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701, 983 (1979), afrd
by an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982) (alterations after the first one in the
original)); see also 121 F.T.C. at 290 ("we ... review for ourselves whether CDA confers
pecuniary benefits upon its members as a substantial part of its activities").
613 128 F.3d at 725-26 ("The FTC has consistently held that it has jurisdiction over a
nonprofit entity if a substantial part of the entity's total activities provides pecuniary
benefits to its members.... The FTC's approach of looking at whether the organization
provides tangible, pecuniary benefits to its members as a surrogate for 'profit' is a proper
way of deciding which nonprofit organizations are subject to its jurisdicition.").
64 Brief for the Respondent at Heading I, California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 119 S. Ct.
1604 (1999) (No. 97-1625) [hereinafter SG Brief]; id. at 8; see also Supreme Court Tran-
script, supra note 54, at 32 (Mr. Wallace) ("As long as the pecuniary benefit that they're
engendering for their members is a substantial part of the organization's total activities
rather than incidental to some noncommercial activity .... ). The SG argued that because
"the word 'profit' is capable of the construction that the FTC has placed on it ... that
construction is entitled to deference" under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (citing Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi,
487 U.S. 354, 380-82 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring)). SG Brief at 11. CDA responded
that Chevron was inapplicable because Congressional intent was clear, and it protested
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exercise ofjurisdiction with words that the Court decided to seize: "From
its earliest days, the FTC has exercised itsjurisdiction over anticompetitive
practices by nonprofit associations whose activities provided substantial
economic benefits to their for-profit members' businesses .... -65 This
apparently triggered a colloquy at oral argument where justice Ginsburg
suggested that the focus would better be on "substantial benefits" than
on "substantial activities." 66 The suggestion must have appealed to
entire Court.
In its opinion, the Court formally adopted a jurisdictional test that
turns on whether nonprofit associations provide their for-profit members
with substantial economic benefits. The Court said that the Commission
"now advances ... [this] slightly different formulation," quoting from
the SG's brief, and concluded that because "the interpretation urged"
in the brief is "clearly the better reading of the statute," the Court did not
need to consider the SG's request for "deference to this interpretation of
the Commission's jurisdiction." 67 In fact, as noted above, the SG had
never requested deference for this interpretation because he was defend-
ing the Commission's slightly different interpretation.
While thus claiming to adhere to a standard advanced by the Commis-
sion, the Court rejected the Commission's practice of examining a non-
profit association's activities. 68 Instead, the Court held that "an entity
organized to carry on activities that will confer greater than de minimis
that the Commission had not sought Chevron deference before the Ninth Circuit-even
admitting at oral argument that deference isn't owed on this sort of jurisdictional ques-
tion-and thus the Court could "ignore" the argument. Reply Brief of Petitioner, CDA,
at 8-9 & n.8 [hereinafter CDA Supreme Court Reply Brief]. The FTC of course participated
in writing the SG's brief, which bears the names of the FTC General Counsel and Assistant
General Counsel and two FTC attorneys, but for simplicity this article will refer simply to
the "SG's" brief.
For a good review of this Chevron dispute that argues vigorously against deference to
"peripheral jurisdictional issues," see Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Delegation: What
Should WeDo AboutIt? ControllingChevron-Based Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 989 (1999).
65 SG Brief, supra note 64, at 9; cf id. Heading I.A.
66 Supreme Court Transcript, supra note 54, at 35-36:
QUESTION: Mr. Wallace, may I seek this clarification? You are trying to get
some kind of a handle on pecuniary benefits by using the word substantiality.
[Yes] But you've used that to modify activities. Perhaps what it should modify is
the business benefits .... [M]aybe the substantiality belongs with what is the
benefit to the business of the dentists rather than the activity. Or doesn't it matter?
MR. WALLACE: Well, I did not choose the formulation that I used. I was
quoting the commission's formulation and-
QUESTION: A problem counsel is often faced with, yes.
(Laughter.)
67 119 S. Ct. at 1610.
68 Id. at 1611 ("There is... no apparent reason to let the statute's application turn on
meeting some threshold percentage of activity for this purpose, or even satisfying a softer
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or presumed economic benefits on profit-seeking members certainly
falls within the Commission's jurisdiction." 69 As the Court somewhat
cryptically wrote, "To be sure, proximate relation to lucre must appear;
the FTC Act does not cover all membership organizations of profit-
making corporations without more, and an organization devoted solely
to professional education may lie outside the FTC Act's jurisdictional
reach .... "70
With all due respect, it is not good judicial craftsmanship to claim to
adopt an agency's view while adopting a different standard, even if
that standard is taken from an agency brief. FTC Commissioners most
formally set forth their views in opinions, which are adopted by vote
after lengthy deliberation and circulation of drafts. Commissioner names
go on opinions, not briefs. 71 Deference is owed to agency opinions, not
to briefs even of the consistently high level of excellence attained by
the Solicitor General. 72
Nor is the Commission likely to test the outer boundaries ofjurisdiction
under the Court's formulation. For instance, Deputy Solicitor General
Wallace was asked about fraternal organizations, such as the Knights of
Columbus and the Elks, which might facilitate their members receiving
discount homeowners insurance. One Justice observed, "I really find it
hard to see what ... the exemption was put in for if the Knights of
formulation calling for a substantial part of the nonprofit entity's total activities to be
aimed at its members' pecuniary benefit.").
69 Id. at 1611 n.6. The Court reserved on whether the FTC has jurisdiction over some
nonprofit organizations that do not confer economic benefits on for-profit members, and
on "whether a purpose of contributing to profit only in a presumed sense, as by enhancing
professional educational efforts, would implicate the Commission's jurisdiction." Id.
70 Id. at 1611.
71 The Solicitor General's CDA brief bears the names of the Solicitor General and two
lawyers in his office, the Assistant Attorney General, the FTC's General Counsel and
two lawyers in her office, and an attorney from the FTC's Bureau of Competition. The
Commission opinion in CDA was authored by Chairman Pitofsky and joined by two other
Commissioners. Commissioners Azcuenaga and Starek filed separate opinions that con-
curred in the Commission majority's finding of jurisdiction.
72 See, e.g., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 246 (1972) ("[W]e must look
to its [the FTC's] opinion, not to the arguments of its counsel, for the underpinning of
its order. 'Congress has delegated to the administrative official and not to appellate
counsel the responsibility for elaborating and enforcing statutory commands."' (quoting
Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 628 (1971)); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318
U.S. 80, 88 (1943) (review of the validity of SEC order is confined to the grounds upon
which the Commission based its action).
Ironically, CDA had protested that an SG argument concerning jurisdiction (that the
Commission was entitled to Chevron deference) had not been made below and thus the
Court was "entitled to ignore" it. CDA Supreme Court Reply Brief, supra note 64, at 9
(citing Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1994)).
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Columbus and the Elk are covered. ' 73 General Wallace responded that
the Commission had always agreed "that purely charitable organizations
are not covered, and that might include other eleemosynary organiza-
tions. ' 74 Even though one could argue that membership in organizations
can facilitate business networking and develop social skills of economic
benefit, it seems unlikely that the Commission will seize on the Court's
new formulation to attack entities that would not have satisfied the
Commission's traditional standard. Nor, since the actual CDA holding
(i.e., the facts conjoined with the result) is consistent with the FIC's
traditional test, is it clear that a court would go beyond that holding to
confer jurisdiction over a genuine charity, regardless whether it confers
economic benefits. By adopting language unexplored by the Commission
and the lower courts and not actually advocated by the Commission
itself, however, the Supreme Court has created uncertainty about just
how far the Commission's jurisdiction extends.
III. PROFESSIONAL ADVERTISING
The Supreme Court majority evinced extraordinary antipathy toward
professional advertising. The Court ruled that a complete ban on all
advertisements of quality or across-the-board discounts could be lawful.
This proposition is sufficiently audacious that CDA did not rely on it
before the Commission or the Ninth Circuit. Indeed, in the proceeding
on remand in the Ninth Circuit, CDA has called for briefing on issues
relating to professional advertising because "[t] he parties did not address
these issues in their briefs to this Court on the initial appeal . . -75
The Supreme Court began by summarizing what it saw as problems
associated with professional advertising. Citing secondary sources not
suggested by the parties or amici, it wrote about information disparities,
the difficulty of comparing service packages and getting and verifying
information, the challenge of measuring quality, and the possibly irratio-
nal ties between patients and particular professionals. 76 The Court major-
73 Supreme Court Transcript, supra note 54, at 34.
1 Id.
75 Motion of California Dental Association for a Briefing Schedule and for Oral Argu-
ment, No. 96-70409 (9th Cir. filed Oct. 22, 1999).
71 119 S. Ct. at 1613-14 (citing Jack Carr & Frank Mathewson, The Economics of Law
Firms: A Study in the Legal Organization of the Firm, 33J.L. & EcON. 307, 309 (1990); George
A. Akerlof, The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 QJ.
ECON. 488 (1970); Hayne Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum
Quality Standards, 87J. POL. ECON. 1328,1330 (1979)); 1 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH
LAw § 3-1, at 86 (1995); Robert G. Evans, Professionals and the Production Function: Can
Competition Policy Improve Efficieny in the Licensed Professions?, in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE
AND REGULATION 235-36 (Simon Rottenberg ed., 1980). The Court did not discuss the
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ity is obviously uncomfortable with advertising by professionals.77
(Indeed, it observed, with perhaps more wishful thinking than empiri-
cism, that for "professional services ... advertising is relatively rare." 78)
The Supreme Court majority subscribed to the notion that there is
something nefarious about "unverifiable" ads. Thus, it wrote that the
threshold issue in the case "is whether professional price and quality
advertising is sufficiently verifiable in theory and in fact" that a ban of
"truthful and verifiable price and quality advertising" should require
justification. 79 The Court simply asserted that only advertisements that
"are both verifiable and true" deserve to "escape censure. ' 80
literature showing that prices of professional services tend to be lower where advertising
is more freely permitted, see, e.g., RONALD BOND ET AL., EFFECTS OF RESTRICTIONS ON
ADVERTISING AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN THE PROFESSIONS: THE CASE OF OPTOMETRY
(1980); Lee Benham & Alexandra Benham, Regulating Through the Professions: A Perspective
on Information Control, 18J.L. & ECON. 421 (1975).
7 The Court quoted almost all of footnote 17 from the landmark decision applying
antitrust to legal services, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788-89 n.17 (1985):
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a
business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint
violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions
as interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically to apply to
the professions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas, the public
service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a particular
practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in
another context, be treated differently.
(quoted at 119 S. Ct. at 1613 n.10). It is revealing that the 5-4 splits in CDA and Florida
Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995), which upheld Florida's 30-day bar on lawyer
solicitation of accident victims, were identical except that Justices Breyer and Souter
traded places. The Chief Justice andJustices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas were in both
majorities; Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg dissented in both. The Chief Justice
and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Souter (with Justice White; Justice Thomas had not
yet replaced Justice Marshall) were also together in the Chief Justice's opinion for the
Court in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991), which emphasized the
legitimacy of much state regulation of lawyer speech.
Florida Bar turned on the protection of lawyer communications as commercial speech,
but issues obviously overlap. See generally Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional
Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 858-59
(1999) (review of commercial speech doctrine and its underpinnings, with a sympathetic
review of Florida Bar); Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Aftaid of Commercial Speech?,
76 VA. L. REv. 627 (1990) (unabashed defense of commercial speech); Fred S. McChesney,
Commercial Speech in the Professions: The Supreme Court s Unanswered Questions and Questionable
Answers, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 45 (1985) (advertising is important to lawyer competition);
Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1181 (1988) (worrying about the too-casual protection of commercial speech);
Marc David Lawlor, Note, Ivory Tower Paternalism and Lawyer Advertising: The Case of Florida
Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 895 (1996) (criticizing the case).
78 119 S. Ct. at 1613.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 1616.
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With respect to discount advertising, the stone on which the Commis-
sion stumbled was the Supreme Court's belief that CDA's regulations
might simultaneously eliminate all across-the-board advertising and
encourage detailed advertising of specific prices for particular services,
with the net effect being to increase the amount of pricing information
that consumers receive. "CDA's rule appears to reflect the prediction
that any costs to competition associated with the elimination of across-
the-board advertising will be outweighed by gains to consumer informa-
tion ... created by discount advertising that is exact, accurate, and more
easily verifiable (at least by regulators)." 81 The court of appeals had
observed that CDA appeared to prohibit all across-the-board discounts
and that "the record provides no evidence that the rule has in fact led
to increased disclosure and transparency of dental pricing. 82 The Court
chastised the Ninth Circuit for what the Supreme Court regarded as
relying merely on the absence of information.
For quality claims, the Ninth Circuit had ruled that even though they
are difficult to verify, "this concern 'does not justify banning all quality
claims without regard to whether they are, in fact, false or misleading.' "'8
The Supreme Court commented that the Ninth Circuit had wrongly
assumed that some quality claims deserve to be permitted "because they
are both verifiable and true."84 This was error, according to the Court,
because it was "at least equally plausible" that banning all quality claims
"would have a procompetitive effect by preventing misleading or false
claims that distort the market. '8 5
A. PROFESSIONAL ADVERTISING: THE LITIGATION
Although not entirely its own fault,8 6 the Supreme Court was unfair
to the Ninth Circuit. That court's emphasis on whether CDA interfered
with truthful advertising responded directly to the justification for its
actions on which CDA relied before the Commission and the Ninth
Circuit. The justifications the Supreme Court found plausible were not
ones on which issue had been joined below.
11 Id. at 1615; see also id. at 1614-15 ("Whether advertisements that announced discounts
for, say, first-time customers, would be less effective at conveying information relevant to
competition if they listed the original and discounted prices for checkups, X-rays, and
fillings, than they would be if they simply specified a percentage discount across the board,
seems to us a question susceptible to empirical but not a priori analysis.").
s2 1 2 8 F.3d at 728.
83 119 S. Ct. at 1616 (quoting 128 F.3d at 728).
8 4 119 S. Ct. at 1616.
81 Id. (citations omitted).
86 The Solicitor General might have been more pointed in his comments on this subject.
See infra note 292.
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Before the Commission, CDA argued that its activities must be procom-
petitive or, at worst, harmless, because it lacked market power,"7 and it
insisted that the ALJ was simply wrong in concluding that it banned any
truthful advertising.88 CDA asserted that it and its components challenged
only advertisements that they believed, "in good faith ... are false or
misleading in a material respect to consumers of ordinary prudence.""
"Competition for consumers of dental services in California is flourishing
and intensifying," CDA insisted.90 Pointing to "Yellow Pages" advertise-
ments that had been entered into the record largely by Complaint Coun-
sel,9' CDA claimed that the number of advertisements had increased
and that consumers "have ready access to dental advertisements" that
"offer 'senior discounts' and other 'across-the-board discounts' that
boast of " 'low' or 'affordable' " fees, and that make " 'comfort,' " state
of the art or modern,' ..". superiority,' " and other "so-called 'quality
claims.' "92 Thus, when the Commission addressed CDA's justifications
87 Brief of Appellant CDA, California Dental Ass'n, FTC Dkt. No. 9259, at 27-28 [herein-
after CDA Commission Brief]; see infra Part V.C. 1(a).
18 CDA Commission Brief, supra note 87, at Heading V.B "The Evidence Does Not
Support The ALJ's Finding That CDA 'Bans' Truthful Advertising."
s9 Id. at 46. CDA claimed that dental services are an "experience good" for which there
is an information "asymmetry," and it cited Bates for the proposition that "unverifiable
quality or performance claims, 'under some circumstances, might well be deceptive or
misleading to the public, even false,' " but this discussion was merely supportive of CDA's
assertion that it challenged only ads which were believed to be false or misleading. Id.
at 44-46.
90 Reply Brief of Appellant CDA, California Dental Ass'n, FTC Dkt. No. 9259, at 20
[hereinafter CDA Commission Reply Brief].
91 During oral argument before the Commission, Complaint Counsel was asked about
dentists' Yellow Pages advertising, and responded as follows:
An important thing to note is that most of these exhibits and excerpts from
dental advertising were put in the record by complaint counsel, and the reason
being is that they actually do show a high level of adherence ....
Let me give you one example .... There are over 1100 individual listings in
the San Francisco Yellow Pages for dentists, but there are only six advertising
senior citizen discounts. As best we can tell, only three of them are CDA members.
[W]e are not really sure how many of these cases CDA has actually gone
after .... But based on the evidence in the record, it suggests they have probably
gone after the vast majority of even those.
Transcript of Oral Argument, California Dental Ass'n, FTC Dkt. No. 9259, at 34-35
[hereinafter Commission Transcript].
92 CDA Commission Reply Brief, supra note 90, at 21-22:
These exhibits demonstrate that consumers incontrovertibly have ready access
to dental advertisements that:
" make so-called "comfort and caring claims" designed to appeal or assuage
consumer fears and or previous negative dental experiences;
" make so-called "superiority claims" designed to set the advertising dentist apart
from his or her competitors or to separate the advertising dentist from consumer
perceptions concerning dentists;
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of its nonprice advertising restraints, it addressed CDA's claim that "CDA
challenges only advertising that is false and misleading." 93
At oral argument before the Commission, CDA's counsel set out to
make "three contentions," none of which related to justifications: (1)
since CDA "did not have market power as expressly found by the Adminis-
trative Law Judge, there is no violation of Section 5;" (2) "there was not
a unity of purpose or a common design in [sic] understanding or a
meeting of the minds;" and (3) "CDA is a bona fide 'not for profit,' and
as such is not subject to FTC jurisdiction."94 During the argument, CDA
insisted that "there is no ban" on quality claims, and dentists are free to
advertise "quality care dentistry. 9 5 Despite continuous pressing for any
justification for restricting truthful discount claims, not once did counsel
suggest a net pro-disclosure effect; instead, the assertion was that CDA
had not caused even a gross lessening of disclosure, and that the ALJ
found no anticompetitive effect. 96 Indeed, counsel seemed to agree that
" make so-called "quality claims" designed to set the advertising dentist apart
from his or her competitors or to separate the advertising dentist from consumer
perceptions concerning dentists;
" claim that the fees of the advertising dentist are "low" or "affordable" or use
terms or phrases of similar import;
" offer "senior discounts" and other similar "across-the-board discounts" without
specifying all fee variables; and
" use "state of the art" or "modern" or terms and phrases of similar import.
93 121 F.T.C. at 316. CDA's argument that its activities were "procompetitive" was based
principally on the assertion thatJudge Parker had found (see supra note 14) (1) no negative
effect on competition and (2) " 'that scrutiny of dental advertising is procompetitive
because advertising which is false or misleading has a negative impact on competition."
CDA Commission Brief, supra note 87, at 27 (quoting ALJ Finding 324) (emphasis omit-
ted). As part of a discussion asserting that CDA does not "ban[] truthful advertising," id.
at 34, CDA asserted that it "encourages full disclosure of price information." Id. at 36
(emphasis omitted). Other than citing one witness who said the disclosure requirements
are not burdensome, id. at 37, there is no assertion, let alone citation of evidence, that
dentists actually engage in any of the kind of detailed discount advertising theoretically
permitted by CDA. For discount and nondiscount advertising, CDA claimed that it pre-
vented only advertising reasonably believed to be "false or misleading in a material respect."
Id. at 46. This part of CDA's argument was relatively perfunctory; the heart of the argument
concerned market power.
94 Commission Transcript, supra note 91, at 4-5.
,1 Id. at 67. But cf id. at 64 (CDA argued because there is "asymmetric information,"
comparative advertising may lead them to an inferior dentist who will discourage them
from ever again seeking dental care).
91 When Chairman Pitofsky sought to examine competitive effects, he discussed a hypo-
thetical advertisement of a 10% senior citizen discount. CDA's counsel responded that
such an advertisement would "[n]ot necessarily" violate CDA's ethics code. (CDA's counsel
claimed that the decision would be made by CDA's component societies, for which CDA
should not be held responsible. Id. at 18. "Some of the component societies take that [a
state regulation] to mean that unless you have all of the prices in the advertisement, you
violated the false and misleading standard. Other components take the position that it is
impractical to do that and, therefore, they do not find violation." Id. at 12-13.)
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the restraints would negatively affect prices as a matter of theory; his
only objection was to what he claimed was a failure of proof.
In the Ninth Circuit, CDA advanced similar arguments, although with
a slightly different twist. In a brief principally devoted to other issues
(e.g., market power), CDA argued that it had the "lawful" "purpose" of
restricting only " 'false or misleading' " advertisements, and "any prob-
lems resulting from implementation of that policy" were the responsibil-
ity of components for which "CDA should not be held legally
responsible. 97 In its reply brief, it argued that the Commission had failed
to show that CDA "banned truthful advertising" because the Commission
"never established that the advertising allegedly prohibited by CDA was
'truthful.' "98 A subsequent iteration of this argument alluded to a slightly
different thought, by complaining that there was no record evidence
that prohibited claims were "truthful or substantiated."99 Neither CDA
brief either admitted (even for the sake of an argument) or sought to
justify a ban on quality claims. 100 The Ninth Circuit's opinion emphasized
the strength of the record supporting the Commission's finding that
CDA banned ads without regard to their truthfulness because this was
the finding that CDA attacked so strongly.
In its briefs on the merits to the Supreme Court, CDA justified its
restrictions quite differently than it had at the Commission and with the
When Pitofsky asked for the justification for banning a truthful claim of a 10% discount,
CDA's counsel responded that "there may not be anything wrong with" such an ad. Id.
at 65. Chairman Pitofsky pressed counsel on whether a ban on such advertising would be
.questionable" under the antitrust laws. Counsel responded that there is no antitrust
problem because "what the advertising ban is, it is false and misleading, so it is a question
of interpretation." Id. at 66.
91 CDA Commission Brief, supra note 87, at 63 (quoting initial decision). Perhaps
inspired by Commissioner Azcuenaga's dissent, CDA made more of an argument that
its requirements procompetitively "increase[d] the amount of information provided to
consumers," id. at 32-33, but this assertion was made without much elaboration. CDA's
principal argument was that limitations were imposed by state law, not CDA, and CDA's
requirements were not burdensome.
98 CDA Commission Reply Brief, supra note 90, at 12.
9 Id. at 26 ("Under the circumstances, the FTC's assertion that CDA proscribes truthful
and/or nondeceptive advertising is not supported by substantial evidence.").
100 Even in its reply brief, CDA's position was founded upon a claimed failure of factual
proof: "Although the Commission and FTC staff speculate that the disclosure effectively
bar across-the-board discounts (Br. at 43), neither point to a single instance in which a
dentist desired to advertise a discount but could not because of the burden of making
the disclosures." Id. at 25 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). The Ninth Circuit wrote
that CDA "contends that claims about quality are inherently unverifiable and therefore
misleading," and explained that this would not justify banning all quality claims without
regard to whether they are false or misleading. 128 F.3d at 728. Although inarffully phrased,
the Ninth Circuit probably did not mean that CDA was seeking to justify a complete ban
on quality claims, since CDA's briefs and its litigation before the Commission made no
such claim.
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Ninth Circuit. Whereas CDA insisted to the Commission that "consumers
incontrovertibly have ready access" to advertisements that boast of "'low'
or 'affordable"' fees or "use terms or phrases of similar import,"101 CDA
wrote to the Supreme Court that "[a]dvertisements consisting of unveri-
fiable pricing claims, such as 'lowest prices' or 'bargains,' have been
challenged as being not susceptible of measurement and therefore likely
to be false or misleading."' 102 The subtle focus on the net effect of its
rule, with enhanced disclosures offsetting information lost through the
ban on claims of broad discounts, first appeared in CDA's merits brief
in the Supreme Court.103 In the Supreme Court, CDA placed increased
emphasis on its argument that its "advertising guidelines are procompeti-
tive on their face."'14 Using a new example and relying on a secondary
source not previously cited, CDA asserted that dentists easily could adver-
tise 10 percent off a specific procedure, such as filling a cavity, which
would be meaningful because "only a handful of dental procedures
comprise a large percentage of a dentist's practice. ' 1°5 Although CDA
pointed to no evidence that dentists actually place such advertisements,
it claimed that the Ninth Circuit should have examined "the net competi-
tive effect of a disclosure requirement."' 1 6 CDA thus issued a call for a
carefully quantified balancing.
CDA's justifications of its restrictions on quality claims also benefited
from a new spin in the Supreme Court. CDA recast these restrictions as
"substantiation policies,"'1 7 and reintroduced the concept of "Verifiabil-
ity." Quoting at length from an article it did not cite below, 08 it asserted
that advertising claims "that are unverifiable-such as claims that a den-
tist provides 'progressive' dentistry or the 'finest dental care'-are poten-
tially misleading."' 1 9 Whereas before the Commission CDA had boasted
that consumers are inundated with "so-called 'quality claims"' using
I See supra note 92.
102 CDA Commission Brief, supra note 87, at 5.
103 CDA's petition for certiorari justified its restrictions with a more general claim that
it was "preventing false and misleading advertising." See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
i (Questions Presented), 21.
104 Brief of Petitioner, CDA, No. 97-1625, at 33 (Subheading II.A.2) [hereinafter CDA
Supreme Court Brief].
105 Id. at 36 n. 11 (citing AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, THE 1990 SURVEY OF DENTAL
SERVICES RENDERED 25-29 (1994)).
106 Id. at 37.
107 id. at Heading II.B.2.c ("CDA's substantiation policies prevent misleading professional
advertising and increase consumer information."). LEXIS and Westlaw checks of Supreme
Court filings reveal no other document that used the term "substantiation."
108 Robert B. Reich, Preventing Deception in Commercial Speech, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 775, 801,
803 (1979) (quoted at CDA Supreme Court Brief, supra note 104, at 38-39).
I0 CDA Supreme Court Brief, supra note 104, at 38.
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general terms, such as "modern" and "comfort" and "superiority," "'1 CDA
argued to the Supreme Court that its policies "prohibit[] ... subjective,
unverifiable claims" such as "'progressive' dentistry or 'finest dental
care,' " because such claims "convey no useful information and carry a
significant potential for deception." '' Only to the Supreme Court did
CDA argue that dentists were permitted to advertise only "the facts that
underlie subjective claims."11
B. PROFESSIONAL ADVERTISING: THE SUPREME COURT
CDA's arguments, as crystalized for the first time at the Supreme
Court, found a receptive audience. The Court rattled off a series of ways
in which advertising of across-the-board discounts could be sub-optimal:
by containing misstatements, by being misleading, and by being less
effective than advertisements communicating more detailed pricing
information.1 3 (The concern about misstatements and deception seems
misplaced, since the Court suggested neither that CDA limited its prohibi-
tion to deceptive ads nor that deceptive ads could be prevented only by
a prohibition of all across-the-board discounts.)
The extent of the Court's hostility to professional advertising is illus-
trated by the casualness with which it dismissed the Commission's discus-
sion of "puffing." The Commission had written that "'mere puffing'
deceives no one and has never been subject to regulation.""' 4 The Com-
mission may have presumed that if it could not bar "puffing," a concerted
110 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
CDA Supreme Court Brief, supra note 104, at 5-6, 40.
112 Id. at 40. CDA highlighted Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 3 (1978), a case it did not
cite to the Commission or the Ninth Circuit, as an example of an approach properly
permitting communication only of underlying factual information. CDA's reply brief
argued that "CDA guidelines on quality ads are directed only at those that contain unverifi-
able claims" and (citing another article not cited to the Commission or the Ninth Circuit)
that sellers of "complex services" can use "subjective claims.., to give erroneous 'signals'
of quality." CDA Supreme Court Reply Brief, supra note 64, at 13.
113 119 S. Ct. at 1614-15.
114 121 F.T.C. at 318. The Commission cited, among other things, its Policy Statement
on Deception, 103 F.T.C. 174, 181 (1984) (appended to Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103
F.T.C. 110 (1984)). That Statement explains that certain kinds of advertisements are
"unlikely to deceive consumers acting reasonably," and points in particular to "subjective
claims" and "correctly stated opinion claims." It also indicates that "[t]he Commission
generally will not pursue cases involving obviously exaggerated or puffing representations,
i.e., those that the ordinary consumers do not take seriously." Id. Although the Commission
has a substantiation policy, which requires advertisers and their agencies to "have a reason-
able basis for advertising claims before they are disseminated," this applies only to claims
that "make objective assertions." FTC Policy Statement Regarding Advertising Substantia-
tion, 104 F.T.C. 648, 839 (1983) (appended to Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648,
839 (1983)).
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group of competitors could not."5 The Supreme Court took a very
different view of the matter: "The question here, of course, is not whether
puffery may be subject to governmental regulation, but whether a profes-
sional organization may ban it.""16 Indeed, the Court concluded that
"[i]t is ... entirely possible to understand the CDA's restrictions on
unverifiable quality and comfort advertising as nothing more than a
procompetitive ban on puffery," for which proposition it relied upon
language in Bates."7 It added the surprising observation that banning
quality claims might not affect competition if it banned only claims of
the sort that "many dentists made."" 8
The Court majority's unhappiness with professional advertising is
essential to an understanding of its opinion in CDA."59 It is hard to
imagine the Court countenancing sweeping prohibitions of discount or
quality claims by a dominant association of sellers of software, computers,
or computer servicing; or cellular phones, automobiles, or over-the-
counter medicines; or advisors on physical or financial fitness, even
though some of these involve products where information disparities
loom large, it is difficult to compare products and measure quality, and
there may be irrational ties between sellers and buyers. Judges-who
are, after all, members of the bar-are especially understanding of com-
plaints about the distastefulness of advertising by lawyers and similar
professionals.
Of course, CDA is now binding precedent and can be cited by any
group of competitors interested in lessening competition, or at least
competition on factors communicated to consumers through advertise-
ments. Were CDA unusual only because it involved professionals, there
would now be a substantial risk that its thinking would spread. But CDA
is unusual in a second respect as well.
What really happened in CDA is that a defendant litigated a case on
one theory, relied on a different theory at the Supreme Court, and
prevailed at that stage. Had CDA seriously sought to justify its actions
115 Cf Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (condemning an associa-
tion that was "in reality an extra-governmental agency, which prescribes rules for the
regulation and restraint of interstate commerce, and provides extra-judicial tribunals for
determination and punishment of violations, and thus 'trenches upon the power of the
national legislature and violates the the statute"') (quoting Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v.
United States, 175 U.S. 211, 242 (1989)).
16 119 S. Ct. at 1616 n.14.
17 Id. at 1616; see supra note 27.
Ml 119 S. Ct. at 1616.
119 See David Balto, Some Observations on California Dental Association v. FrC, ANTITRUST,
Fall 1999, at 64.
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to the Commission on the grounds that banning all "puffing" is procom-
petitive, the Commission could have seriously addressed that proposition.
Had CDA argued, not that it allowed claims of subjective quality but
that it was justified in banning all of them, Complaint Counsel could
have dissected that assertion. Had CDA argued that it enhanced competi-
tion by banning "puffing" but encouraging advertising of underlying
"facts," or by banning across-the-board discount claims in order to
increase advertising of pricing information, Complaint Counsel would
have examined the kinds of advertisements that really were run. Had
CDA defended its pricing regulations, not on the basis that they prohibit
only deceptive advertisements but because the quantity of pricing infor-
mation that they cause consumers to receive exceeds the quantity that
is deterred through its ban of broad discount claims, the Commission
would have conducted such a measurement.
The best evidence that such an approach would not have been a
winning strategy is that CDA never tried it. Although the Commission
and courts will have to take seriously the concerns the Supreme Court
expressed in CDA, it would be unfortunate if the Court's CDA opinion
were to make successful a future line of argument that was not even
attempted in the litigation of the case before the Court.
It is important not to exaggerate the scope of CDA's victory, however.
The Supreme Court majority made clear its discomfort with professional
advertising, and its receptivity to justifications for reining it in. The
Ninth Circuit was directed, in effect, to give those justifications a second
hearing. But CDA did not win that which it really sought: invocation of
the full-blown rule of reason, complete with merger-type measurement
of market power.
IV. THE ROLE OF MARKET POWER
The central issue argued by CDA at the Commission, in the Court of
Appeals, and at the Supreme Court was the role of formal proof of
market power. CDA was thus an active participant in the long, slow-
moving debate about market power that has occupied antitrust for a
score of years. 20 The status of this debate is briefly summarized below. 121
120 Market power and its role in antitrust are nicely discussed in Michael S. McFalls, The
Role and Assessment of Classical Market Power in Joint Venture Analysis, 66 ANTITRUST L.J.
651 (1998).
121 The debate is thoroughly discussed in William E. Cohen, Per se Illegality and Truncated
Rule of Reason: The Search for a Foreshortened Antitrust Analysis (FTC Staff Discussion
Draft, Nov. 1997) <http://www.ftc.gov/opp/jointvent/persepap.htm>, and ABA ANTI-
TRUST SECTION, THE RULE OF REASON (forthcoming). Other useful contributions include
Edward Correia, Joint Ventures: Issues in Enforcement Policy, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 737 (1998),
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A. A QUICK LOOK 122 AT THE ORIGIN AND DERIVATION
OF THE FLEXIBLE RULE OF REASON
As any law student struggling to master the subject knows, antitrust is
an Alice in Wonderland world where words do not always mean what they
say. 125 Nowhere is this more true than with respect to what is known as
the rule of reason. Its modern birth was the product of the basic insight
that the statutory words at issue could not be accorded their ordinary
meaning because that would yield an absurdity. The Sherman Act prohib-
its all restraints of trade, 124 yet it is the very nature of even the most
procompetitive contract to restrain. 25 Thus it was said that courts would
apply a "rule of reason" to determine which restraints to ban.
In theory, we know what the rule of reason is. At the most general
level, teachers can still point to the eloquent teaching of Chicago Board
of Trade:
The true test of illegality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine
that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to
the business to which the restraint is applied: its condition before and
after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect,
actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to
exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or
end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. 126
At a more sophisticated level, teachers can point to a burden-shifting
model that has achieved considerable acceptance in the courts of appeal:
[U] nder the "traditional" rule of reason, the plaintiff bears the initial
burden of proving that an agreement has had or is likely to have a
substantially adverse effect on competition. If the plaintiff meets its
initial burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate the
procompetitive virtues of the alleged wrongful conduct. If the defen-
and James A. Keyte, What It Is and How It Is Being Applied: The "Quick Look" Rule of Reason,
ANTITRUST, Summer 1997, at 21.
122 Few can resist the allure of the phrase "quick look." That is one of its problems.
122 Cf LEwis CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND 163 (Norton Critical Ed. 1971) (" 'When
I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose
it to mean-neither more nor less.' ").
124 15 U.S.C. § 1 ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.").
21 Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("But
the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test, as
whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of
trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.").
16 246 U.S. at 238.
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dant does demonstrate procompetitive virtues, then the plaintiff must
show that the challenged conduct is not reasonably necessary to achieve
the stated objective. 127
Although this has surface appeal as an elegant assignment of responsi-
bilities, beneath the surface lies a truth that plaintiffs and prosecutors
understand all too well: when the full, formal rule of reason is the
governing standard, plaintiffs almost never win. The initial plaintiff's
burden of showing actual anticompetitive effects "is often impossible to
make.., due to the difficulty of isolating the market effects of challenged
conduct. Accordingly, courts typically allow proof of the defendant's
'market power' instead." 2 s
The judicial invitation to plaintiffs to prove market power does plain-
tiffs no favor, however. As a practical matter, making market power an
issue means that defendants can and do hire talented economists who
help them win motions to dismiss or summary judgment on grounds of
market shares of perhaps 20-30 percent or less,129 or ease of entry, or
elastic supply or demand, or powerful buyers, or excess capacity, or
changing conditions. Any plaintiff filing a "full blown" rule of reason
case faces the prospect of long, expensive discovery, extensive motions
practice, and then a merger-like battle over market power without the
benefit of the prophylactic language of Clayton Act Section 7. Making
a decision turn on a full, formal proof of market power, the antitrust
equivalent of the Full Monty, is a defendant's paradise. 30
127 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 53 (4th ed. 1997) (foot-
notes omitted); see also, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Under
this approach, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that an agreement had a
substantially adverse effect on competition. If the plaintiff meets this burden, the burden
shifts to the defendant to come forward with evidence of the procompetitive virtues of
the alleged wrongful conduct. If the defendant is able to demonstrate procompetitive
effects, the plaintiff then must prove that the challenged conduct is not reasonably neces-
sary to achieve the legitimate objectives or that those objectives can be achieved in a
substantially less restrictive manner. Ultimately, if these steps are met, the harms and
benefits must be weighed against each other in order to judge whether the challenged
behavior is, on balance, reasonable.") (citations omitted); KM.B. Warehouse Distribs.,
Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1995) (same).
128 E.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
The use of market power to screen meritorious cases from frivolous ones was advocated
with particular vigor by now-Judge Easterbrook. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits
of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1984).
1"9 See, e.g., Assam Drug Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 798 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1986) (affirming
summaryjudgment because Miller Beer, with a 19.1% market share, lacked market power);
see also Richard Steuer, The Turning Points in Distribution Law, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 467,
513-18 (1990); cf. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (tying
case finding that defendant with market share of approximately 30% lacked market power).
130 For an empirical demonstration that courts almost always dispose of rule of reason
cases without reaching the stage of balancing procompetitive and anticompetitive effects,
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Plaintiffs' lawyers and prosecutors have not survived by being fools,
so they sought to avoid the full-blown rule of reason by aggressive invoca-
tion of the per se rule. That movement came to an end with Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System. 131 During the 1980s and 1990s,
the courts have gradually cut back on the reach of the per se rule."2
Inevitably, plaintiffs and prosecutors have struggled to find some alter-
native way to win. Courts have occasionally accommodated them,
although there have been far fewer litigated victories than speeches,
articles, and consent orders. Three Supreme Court cases are associated
with what has been known variously as the "quick look" or the "truncated"
or "abbreviated" or "structured" or "flexible" rule of reason. Each case
is problematic. The agencies and the lower courts also have sought,
without complete success, to fashion this middle ground.
1. In the Supreme Court
The first case sometimes associated with this middle category spent
most of its life as a per se case. In National Society of Professional Engineers
v. United States'33 the lower courts had condemned, as per se illegal, an
ethical rule prohibiting competitive bidding. 34 The government
defended the result solely on the ground that the per se rule applied. 135
The Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the lower courts had properly
refused to consider the engineers' proffered justification that they were
members of a learned profession acting to prevent competition from
endangering public safety. But, for some unexplained reason, Justice
Stevens, writing for the Court, said that "the asserted defense rests on a
fundamental misunderstanding of the Rule of Reason.' 1 36 The Court
added that professionals' "[e]thical norms may serve to regulate and
see Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect (unpublished
manuscript on file with the author).
131 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
132 NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998) (vertical boycotts); State Oil Co.
v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (maximum resale prices); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc.
v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985) (certain group boycotts); NCAA
v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (certain necessary restraints). But cf Palmer v.
BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (horizontal market division); FTC v. Superior
Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (horizontal price fixing). For a commentary
suggesting that Khan is a significant rejection of the value of trader freedom, see Alan J.
Meese, Economic Theoy, Trader Freedom, and Consumer Welfare: State Oil Co. v. Khan and the
Continuing Incoherence of Antitrust Doctrine, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 763 (1999).
1" 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (Stevens, J.).
134 04 F. Supp. 457 (D.D.C. 1975), affd in part and remanded in part, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
135 Brief for the United States, National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (No. 76-1767).
1"' Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 681.
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promote ... competition, and thus fall within the Rule of Reason."' 13 7
Yet it also said that "[o]n its face, this agreement restrains trade within
the meaning of § 1 of the Sherman Act": "While this is not price fixing
as such, no elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the
anticompetitive character of such an agreement."3 8
Ever since Professional Engineers was issued, observers have disagreed
as to whether it is a rule of reason or a per se case. 13 9 Ironically, during
the CDA oral argument Justice Stevens, author of Professional Engineers,
asked CDA counsel whether or not he viewed Professional Engineers as "a
quick look case."'' 40
In NCAA v. Board of Regents,14 1 the Supreme Court refused to apply
the per se rule to a horizontal agreement among colleges jointly to
market television rights to intercollegiate football games. Nonetheless,
the Court ruled that defendants' claimed lack of market power was
irrelevant because, "[a] s a matter of law, the absence of proof of market
power does not justify a naked restriction on price or output," and
the challenged agreement was such a restraint. 42 Quoting Professional
Engineers, the Court wrote that "when there is an agreement not to
compete in terms of price or output, 'no elaborate industry analysis
is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an
agreement.' ",143 Citing an unusually ambitious Solicitor General amicus
brief (which set out a structured approach to a flexible rule of reason'44),
the Court wrote that a "naked restraint on price and output requires
some competitive justification even in the absence of a detailed market
analysis."1 45 The Court did not adequately explain why a "naked restric-
tion on price or output" should not be condemned as per se illegal. 4 6
1s7 Id. at 696.
138 Id. at 692-93.
"I Compare, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 357, 362 (1982)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (per se) and Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc. 446 U.S. 643, 647
(1980) (per curiam) (same) with, e.g., Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986)
(citing Professional Engineers for proposition that Court has been "slow to condemn rules
adopted by professional associations as unreasonable per se") and Community Communica-
tions Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 60, 65-66 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(Professional Engineers limits factors that may be considered tinder rule of reason).
140 Supreme Court Transcript, supra note 54, at 29.
141 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
112 Id. at 109-10.
143 Id. at 109.
14 See infta at notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
" 468 U.S. at 110 & n.42.
146 See WesleyJ. Liebeler, Horizontal Restrictions, Efficiency, and the Per Se Rule, 33 UCLA
L. Rev. 1019 (1986) (agreement should have been per se illegal).
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Even stranger, the Court nonetheless proceeded to find that the NCAA
in fact had market power.'47
The Court engaged in a similar exercise in FTC v. Indiana Federation
of Dentists,'4" in which it affirmed an FTC finding that a collective refusal
by dentists to make X-rays freely available to insurance companies violated
Section 5 of the FTC Act. "A refusal to compete with respect to the
package of services offered to customers, no less than a refusal to compete
with respect to the price term of an agreement, impairs the ability of
the market to advance social welfare ...."14 The Commission's failure
to engage in "elaborate market analysis" was unimportant for two inde-
pendent reasons. First, the dentists' agreement was a "naked restriction
on price or output," which " 'requires some competitive justification
even in the absence of a detailed market analysis.' "110 Second, there
were what the Court described as "actual, sustained adverse effects on
competition," which can "obviate the need for an inquiry into market
power."'' But the Court's discussion of competitive effects was not refer-
ring to customary measures, such as increased prices or reduced output
(which measures, the Seventh Circuit had said, did not indicate harm
to competition). Rather, the only effect on competition was that insurers
were "actually unable to obtain compliance with their requests for submis-
sion of x-rays." 152 In other words, it was sufficient to show that the dentists
had adhered to their agreement. The Court was untroubled by the lack
of evidence that prices had increased.5 3 As in NCAA, the Court really
was applying what one might term a "thoughtful per se rule," and in the
process analyzed the likely competitive effect of the challenged conduct
while denying the necessity of doing so.
2. In the Agencies
The antitrust enforcement agencies have wrestled with various formu-
lations for a middle category. One of the most ambitious efforts occurred
1
47 NCAA, 468 U.S. at 111-13.
148 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
149 Id. at 459.
150 Id. at 460 (quoting NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109-10 (1984)).
's' Id. at 461 (quoting PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1511, at 429 (1986),where
market power was described as "but a 'surrogate for detrimental effects' ").
152 Id. at 460.
153 Id. at 461-62 ("A concerted and effective effort to withhold (or make more costly)
information desired by consumers for the purpose of determining whether a particular
purchase is cost justified is likely enough to disrupt the proper functioning of the price-
setting mechanism of the market that it may be condemned even absent proof that it
resulted in higher prices or, as here, the purchase of higher priced services, than would
occur in its absence.") (citation to Professional Engineers omitted).
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in the amicus brief that the Solicitor General, with the Federal Trade
Commission, filed in NCAA. 54 Relying on, among other things, the work
of Professors Sullivan and Areeda, 155 the SG advocated a "middle ground"
that he referred to variously as an "abbreviated" and a "truncated" rule
of reason:
[C]ourts should first ask whether challenged conduct is likely, absent
an efficiency justification,'56 to lead to the restriction of output, for
such conduct is inherently suspect. Where output restriction does
appear likely, we must ask whether there is a plausible efficiency justifi-
cation for the practice, i.e., is there reason to believe that the restraint
may nonetheless have significant efficiency benefits and therefore
enhance competition and output. In the event that there is no plausible
efficiency justification, the suspect practice is per se illegal....
But, in cases where the participants raise a plausible efficiency justifi-
cation for conduct that is facially suspect, per se characterization is
inappropriate, because more scrutiny is needed to evaluate the
restraint's overall competitive effect. It may be that further examination
will show that the proffered efficiency justification should be rejected;
in that event, the conduct can still be condemned as unreasonable
without completing a "full" rule of reason analysis that includes market
definition and market power determinations. On the other hand, if
efficiency benefits are shown to be likely, a more elaborate rule of
reason inquiry is called for, with a thorough analysis of market power,
in order to determine whether the practice is, on balance, harmful
or beneficial. 57
The Federal Trade Commission, which had joined in the SG's NCAA
amicus brief, built upon that approach and formally adopted a structured
series of questions in Massachusetts Board of Registration in Optometry:
First, we ask whether the restraint is "inherently suspect." In other
words, is the practice the kind that appears likely, absent an efficiency
, Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, NCAA v. Board of Regents [hereinafter
Amicus Brief.] Earlier steps were taken by the Federal Trade Commission. See American
Med. Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701, 1004 (1979) (Clanton, Comm'r) ("the contours of the analysis
required under the rule or reason will vary somewhat depending upon the nature of the
restraint"), affd, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), affd ry an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 676
(1982); Michigan State Med. Soc'y, 101 F.T.C. 191,292 (1983) (Clanton, Conm'r) ("Where
horizontal arrangements so closely relate to prices or fees as they do here, a less elaborate
analysis of competitive effects is required." (citing Professional Engineers)).
155 Amicus Brief, supra note 154, at 7 n.6 (citing LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 192
(1977); Phillip Areeda, The "Rule of Reason" in Antitrust Analysis: General Issues 37-38
(Federal Judicial Center June 1981)).
156 An efficiency justification exists if the challenged restraint increases the quantity or
quality, or reduces the cost, of overall output-e.g., by creating a new product, improving
the operation of a market, or reducing production or marketing costs-and is reasonably
necessary to achieve such efficiencies.
117 Brief for the National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Reversal, CDA, No. 97-1625, at 16 [hereinafter NCAA Amicus Brief] (footnote in original).
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justification, to "restrict competition and decrease output"?... If the
restraint is not inherently suspect, then the traditional rule of reason,
with attendant issues of market definition and power, must be
employed. But if it is inherently suspect, we must pose a second question:
Is there a plausible efficiencyjustification for the practice? That is, does
the practice seem capable of creating or enhancing competition (e.g.,
by reducing the costs of producing or marketing the product, creating
a new product, or improving the operation of the market)? Such an
efficiency defense is plausible if it cannot be rejected without extensive
factual inquiry. If it is not plausible, then the restraint can be quickly
condemned. But if the efficiency justification is plausible, further
inquiry-a third inquiy-is needed to determine whether the justifica-
tion is really valid. If it is, it must be assessed under the full balancing
test of the rule of reason. But if the justification is, on examination,
not valid, then the practice is unreasonable and unlawful under the
rule of reason without further inquiry-there are no likely benefits to
offset the threat to competition. 5
Later that same year, the Antitrust Division issued a new version of its
Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations. These
formally set forth the Division's somewhat different structured set of
questions, which the Division said it would apply in making a rule of
reason analysis of a joint venture.' Although this set off a series of
debates about the differences and advantages of the sets of dueling
158 110 F.T.C. 549, 604 (1988) (Calvani, Cmm'r). The most vigorous criticism of the
FTC's "Mass. Board" approach is Joseph Kattan, The Role of Efficiency Considerations in the
Federal Trade Commission's Antitrust Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 613 (1996); see alsoJohn E.
Lopatka, Antitrust and Professional Rules: A Framework for Analysis, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
301, 375-79 (1991) (preferring more weight to market power). The approach is defended
with equal vigor in Timothy J. Muris, The Federal Trade Commission and the Rule of Reason:
In Defense of Massachusetts Board, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 773 (1998); TimothyJ. Muris, The
New Rule of Reason, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 859 (1989); andJames L. Langenfeld & Louis Silvia,
Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Restraint Cases: An Economic Perspective, 61 ANTITRUST
L.J. 653 (1993).
15 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,109, at 20,600 (footnote omitted):
First, the Department determines whether the joint venture would likely have
any anticompetitive effect in the market or markets in which the joint venture
proposes to operate or in which the economic integration of the parties' opera-
tions occurs (the 'Joint venture markets"). Second, the Department determines
whether the joint venture or any of its restraints would likely have an anticompeti-
tive effect in any other market or markets ("spillover markets") in which the joint
venture members are actual or potential competitors outside of the joint venture.
Third, using the analysis described in Section 3.5 of the Guidelines, the Depart-
ment analyzes the likely competitive effects of any nonprice vertical restraints
imposed in connection with the joint venture. The Department will not challenge
a joint venture if under the first three steps, the Department concludes that the
joint venture would not likely have any significant anticompetitive effects. If,
however, the Department's analysis under the first three steps reveals significant
anticompetitive risks, then, under step 4, the Department considers whether any
procompetitive efficiencies that the parties claim would be achieved by the joint
venture would outweigh the risk of anticompetitive harm.
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questions,160 the important point was that, unlike the FT C in Mass. Board,
the Division preferred to examine efficiencies last rather than first.
Somewhat ironically, shortly after the FTC refrained from applying
Mass. Board in CDA,161 AAG Joel Klein unveiled a Justice Department
approach that departed sharply from the Division's former approach
and adopted a series of questions that bore some resemblance to those
in Mass. Board.6 ' Klein's "stepwise approach" stimulated substantial dis-
cussion and an unusually vigorous and insightful "point-counterpoint"
debate that was cited in a CDA amicus brief and then by the Court itself.163
3. In the Lower Courts
The suggestion of a third form of analysis, between the per se rule
and the full-blown rule of reason, first appeared in United States v. Realty
160 See, e.g., Joe Sims, Developments in Agreements Among Competitors, 58 ANTITRUST L.J.
433, 439 (1989):
I have heard Mr. Zuckerman and his counterparts at the Department explain
that there are serious and significant distinctions. But does it matter? Do you
care, do I care, does anybody care? We are at the "head of a pin" stage, unfortu-
nately, and I don't think "rules" like these are likely to be too useful.
161 See supra note 20.
162 Klein said that the Division asks three questions:
[1] Is this "the type of restraint that is currently recognized by the courts as
being a per se violation, such as an unadorned agreement to fix prices, curtail
output, or divide markets?" If so, it is illegal.
[2] If we conclude that a horizontal agreement that directly limits competition
on price or output between or among competitors is not per se illegal, we then
inquire whether there's a procompetitive justification for the agreement. We put
that question to the party defending the agreement, and we expect a response
that doesn't merely speculate about the existence of efficiencies, but rather comes
forward with real-world evidence-factual evidence, expert economic evidence,
and preferably both-to support the claim .... And, if we find that the proffered
procompetitivejustifications are unsubstantiated, we conclude that the agreement
should be struck down.
[3] [I]fwe find there are significant procompetitive benefits to the agreement,
we then ... seek to determine whether its likely anticompetitive effects outweigh
its procompetitive benefits. This weighing and balancing ... often requires an
elaborate market analysis, unless, of course, there is convincing evidence of a
direct market effect on price or output. But in either event, the key point I want
to stress here is that only if there are real procompetitive benefits should there
be any need to show actual anticompetitive effects.
Joel I. Klein, A Stepwise Approach to Antitrust Review of Horizontal Agreements, Address
Before the ABA Antitrust Section Semi-Annual Fall Policy Program (Nov. 7, 1996)
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/jikaba.htm>, reprinted in [Current Comment]
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,157 [hereinafter Klein, Stepwise Speech).
163Joel I. Klein, Point: A "Stepwise"Approach for Analyzing Horizontal Agreements Will Provide
a Much Needed Structure for Antitrust Review, ANTITRUST, Spring 1998, at 41; William J.
Kolasky, Jr., Counterpoint: The Department of Justice's "Stepwise" Approach Imposes Too Heavy a
Burden on Parties to Horizontal Agreements, ANTrRUST, Spring 1998, at 31, cited in NCAA
Amicus Brief, supra note 157, at 17 & 19, and CDA, 119 S. Ct. at 1617 n.15.
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Multi-List, Inc. 164 The Fifth Circuit espoused the concept of a "facial
unreasonableness theory" under which a court may condemn an unjusti-
fied restraint without proof of actual anticompetitive effect, where the
conspirators possessed the ability to harm competition. The court quoted
Professor Sullivan's observation that on the question whether defendants
had sufficient market power, "'a truncated or threshold analysis will
suffice.' "165
The first judge to use the term "quick look" was Judge Posner, in a
pair of opinions he issued shortly after the Supreme Court decided
NCAA. 6 6 In Vogel v. American Society of Appraisers1 67 the Seventh Circuit
considered an appraiser association's ethical rule barring fees as a per-
centage of appraisals. The court cited BMand NCAA for the proposition
that before proceeding to apply the per se rule against price fixing, "we
should take a quick look to see whether it has clear anticompetitive
consequences and lacks any redeeming competitive virtues."1 68 The
Court's "quick look" revealed the existence of a sound justification for
the rule (avoidance of improper incentives or the appearance of fraud),
that the rule probably would not actually affect fees (but only the method
of computing them), and that if the rule had any effect on fees, it would
tend to depress them (because percentage fees tend to inflate appraisals
and thus the dollar amount of fees). Accordingly, the lower court was
correct in refraining from applying the per se rule.
In contrast, in General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Associa-
tion, 69 the Seventh Circuit took a "quick look" at the facts at issue and
then condemned as per se illegal a territorial market division allegedly
justified by the need for local member truck-leasing firms to prevent
free riding. Judge Posner wrote that the defense was unpersuasive
because only services were being provided and members could charge
separately for them (unlike for information, which poses more serious
free-rider problems). Without the free-rider defense, there was nojustifi-
cation for the restraints.
164 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980) (Goldberg, J.). The Realty Multi-List court said that the
form of analysis it outlined was "quite similar to that first envisioned under the rule of
reason by Judge Taft in his opinion in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271
(6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899)." 629 F.2d at 1375 n.49.
"1629 F.2d at 1372 n.39 (quoting LAWRENCF SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 192 (1977)).
166 The Seventh Circuit was just a little quicker than the District Court of Connecticut,
which declined to take a "quick look" at market effects in a price-fixing case in United
States v. Stop & Shop Cos., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,689 (D. Conn. 1984).
167 744 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1984).
68 Id. at 603.
69 744 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1984).
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More recently, the notion of a flexible rule of reason is associated
with two cases, Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA 170 and
Law v. NCAA.171 In the former, the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by
Judge Easterbrook, affirmed the district court's " 'quick look' version of
the Rule of Reason"' 72 to strike down an NBA limitation on the number
of games "superstations" can carry. The court acknowledged that the
rule of reason normally begins by looking at market power, and there
was a substantial argument that the League had none (since it was
competing for TV viewers) and was improving its product. But the court
pointed to NCAA as having rejected a similar argument (ironically pre-
sented by then-private citizen Easterbrook). NCAA taught that "any agree-
ment to reduce output measured by the number of television games
requires some justification-some explanation connecting the practice
to consumers' benefits-before the court attempts an analysis of market
power."' 73 The court then engaged in quite a searching consideration
of the preciseness of the fit between the NBA's actions and its alleged
justification, and, finding it wanting, affirmed the district court. 174
170 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.).
171 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
172 961 F.2d at 676.
171 Id. at 674 ("Unless there are sound justifications, the court condemns the practice
without ado, using the 'quick look' version of the Rule of Reason advocated by Professor
Areeda and by the Solicitor General's brief in NCAA. See 668 U.S. at 109-11 nn.39 & 42;
Phillip E. Areeda, 7 Antitrust Law 1508 (1986)."). Professor Areeda suggested that a
restraint "of the kind that has been regarded as very serious and usually without recognized
redeeming virtue ... may nevertheless avoid summary condemnation if the defendant
claims justification of the kind which a 'quick look'-usually at the arguments alone-
shows to be legitimate in principle and capable of being proved satisfactorily." 7 PHILLIP
E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAw 428-29 (1986).
17, On remand, the NBA argued that it should be treated as a single entity rather than
a cartel. The district court disagreed, but the Seventh Circuit, again in an opinion by
Judge Easterbrook, ruled that "the NBA is sufficiently integrated that its superstation rules
may not be condemned without analysis under the full Rule of Reason." 95 F.3d 593, 600
(7th Cir. 1996). The Court added that "[s]ubstantial market power is an indispensable
ingredient of every claim under the full Rule of Reason." Id.
Previous opinions by Judge Easterbrook had treated arguments for a "quick look"
relatively unsympathetically. In Illinois Corporate Travel, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 806
F.2d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J.), the Seventh Circuit had affirmed the
denial of a preliminary injunction. After addressing claims of per se illegality, the court
continued by looking at at "short form or quick look Rule of Reason analysis" that looks
directly at alleged adverse effects. The plaintiff did not fare well. "Unless the practice
'almost always' makes consumers worse off, it is not subject to condemnation without
more detailed study of its effects-including proof of market power and actual injury."
Id. at 727 (quoting Broadcast Music). Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enterprises, 776 F.2d 185 (7th
Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook,J.), reversed a denial of an injunction to enforce a covenant that
reserved to each of two parties the right to sell certain products. The court essentially
ruled that the restraints were ancillary rather than naked, so they were not per se illegal
and had to be judged under the rule of reason. The court mentioned the "quick look"
only briefly, making the same point as in Illinois Corporate Travel. The court stressed the
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Law v. NCAA relied upon Chicago Professional Sports to apply what it
said was a "quick look rule of reason" to an arrangement that capped
the salaries paid to a particular small category of basketball coaches.
The court applied the rule of reason because horizontal restraints were
necessary, but it affirmed summary judgment against the NCAA even
though the NCAA insisted that its market share and corresponding power
was low:
The NCAA misapprehends the purpose in antitrust law of market defi-
nition, which is not an end unto itself but rather exists to illuminate a
practice's effect on competition.... Thus, where a practice has obvious
anticompetitive effects-as does price-fixing-there is no need to prove
that the defendant possesses market power. Rather, the court is justified
in proceeding directly to the question of whether the procompetitive
justifications advanced for the restraint outweigh the anticompetitive
effects under a "quick look" rule of reason.'
The Tenth Circuit appeared not just to examine the justifications for
the challenged restraints, but to place on the defendant the burden of
proving that the benefits of those restraints outweigh their anticompeti-
tive effects. 76
The "quick look" (or a variation thereof) has fared less well in other
cases, however. Three are worthy of special note. The Commission's
bold use of Mass. Board in Detroit Auto Dealers Association177 met with a
chilly reception in the Sixth Circuit, which regarded the Commission's
"inherently suspect" categorization as an improper application of a per se
approach. 78 The court affirmed the Commission's decision in substantial
importance of market power to the rule of reason: "The first step in any Rule of Reason
case is an assessment of market power. Unless the firms have the power to raise price by
curtailing output, their agreement is unlikely to harm consumers, and it makes sense to
understand their cooperation as benign or beneficial." Id. at 191 (citations omitted).
A plaintiff's attempt to invoke the "quick look" also met with no success in U.S. Healthcare,
Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589 (1st Cir. 1993). The First Circuit, in an opinion by
Judge Boudin, wrote that in NCAA and IFD the Supreme Court had "actually contracted
the per se rule by refusing to apply it to horizontal agreements that involved price and
output fixing ... or the setting of other terms of trade .... Id. at 594-95. The "quick
look" had no applicability to the case before the court, which involved exclusive dealing
that could be judged only under the normal rule of reason.
7 134 F.3d at 1020.
175 See id. at 1024 (Another court "erred as a matter of law to the extent that the court
tried to free the NCAA ... from its burden of showing that the procompetitivejustifications
for a restraint on trade outweigh its anticompetitive effects. The Supreme Court ... made
it clear that the NCAA still shoulders that burden ... and we hold that the NCAA failed
to provide sufficient evidence to carry its burden in this case.") (citation omitted).
"I Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n, 111 F.T.C. 417 (1989), affd in part and remanded, 955
F.2d 457 (6th Cir. 1992), modified on remand, 119 F.T.C. 891 (1995), remanded with direction
for a hearing for further modification, 84 F.3d 787 (6th Cir. 1996).
178 955 F.2d at 471.
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part, but only grudgingly and without endorsing the Commission's rea-
soning, 7 9 and it raised (for consideration on remand) serious questions
about the Commission's remedy. In United States v. Brown University8 °
the Third Circuit reversed a district court's application of the "quick
look" and remanded for consideration under the full rule of reason.
The court held that "[i]f the defendant offers sound procompetitive
justifications,.. . the court must proceed to weigh the overall reasonable-
ness of the restraint using a full-scale rule of reason analysis."' 8' The
Third Circuit rather searchingly scrutinized the special nature of higher
education and the "asserted procompetitive and pro-consumer features"
of an Ivy League financial aid arrangement, and concluded that "the
district court was obliged to more fully investigate the procompetitive
and noneconomic justifications proffered by MIT (the defendant)."182
Finally, a lower court's refusal to use a "quick look" was endorsed in
American Ad Management, Inc. v. GTE Corp. "I The Ninth Circuit pointedly
wrote that "this so-called 'quick look' analysis is the exception, rather
than the rule," 84 although the court went on to reverse the summary
judgment won by the defendant because there were serious factual dis-
putes about market definition, competitive effects, and the reasonable-
ness of the restraint.
When CDA lost at the Commission in a decision the Commission
characterized as applying a "quick look," CDA appealed to the Ninth
Circuit and highlighted this limiting language in American Ad Manage-
ment. CDA argued that its dispute with FTC Complaint Counsel deserved
scrutiny under the full-blown rule of reason.
B. A SETBACK FOR THE "QUICK LOOK" MOVEMENT
CDA will certainly be characterized as a setback for what one might
consider the "quick look" antitrust movement. Indeed, the Court specifi-
179 In contrast, Judge Ryan wrote a vigorous opinion explaining that he would have
affirmed the Commission's decision in its entirety. Id. at 473 (Ryan,J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
180 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
181 Id. at 669; followed, Bogan v. Hodgkins, 166 F.3d 509, 514 n.6 (2d Cir. 1999) (quick
look inappropriate because defendant had set forth "sound allegations of procompeti-
tive benefit").
182 5 F.3d at 678; see also 119 S. Ct. at 1613 (citing Brown University as "finding full rule-
of-reason analysis required where universities sought to provide financial aid to needy
students and noting by way of contrast that the agreements in National Soc. of Professional
Engineers and Indiana Federation of Dentists 'embodied a strong economic self-interest of
the parties to them.' ") (quoting Brown University, 5 F.3d at 677-78).
183 92 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 1996).
l8 Id. at 789.
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cally said that it "decide [d] that the Court of Appeals erred when it held
as a matter of law that quick-look analysis was appropriate (with the
consequence that the Commission's abbreviated analysis and conclusion
were sustainable)." 5 The Court reviewed the Pro Engineers/NCAA/Indi-
ana Federation of Dentists trilogy, quoting NCAA's reference to "naked
restraints," and summarized them as follows:
In each of these cases, which have formed the basis for what has come
to be called abbreviated or "quick-look" analysis under the rule of
reason, an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of econom-
ics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.8 6
In such cases, the Court wrote, "quick-look analysis carries the day when
the great likelihood of anticompetitive effects can easily be ascer-
tained.' 18 7 The Court said that CDA "fails to present a situation in which
the likelihood of anticompetitive effects is comparably obvious." 8
Critics of the quick look can point to three additional aspects of the
Court's opinion. First, the Court showed great sensitivity to the power
of burden shifting. The court of appeals had observed that CDA appeared
to prohibit all across-the-board discounts and that "the record provides
no evidence that the rule has in fact led to increased disclosure and
transparency of dental pricing."189 The Supreme Court sharply criticized
the court of appeals for what the Supreme Court saw as resort to burden
shifting to the answer this critical question: "the absence of any empirical
evidence on this point indicates that the question was not answered,
but merely avoided by implicit burden-shifting." 19 When the Court's
restrictive language about the applicability of the "quick look" is linked
to this sharp criticism of premature burden shifting, 19' foes of the "quick
look" take comfort.
185 119 S. Ct. at 1612.
186 Id. This language was quoted in Granite Partners, L.P. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 7 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 72,604, at 85,435 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1999), where the court, having
denied per se review because the antitcompetitive impact of a conspiracy was "neither
obvious nor easily ascertainable," refused to "engage in yet another form of truncated
antitrust analysis."
l17 119 S. Ct. at 1613.
188 Id.; see also id. at 1617 ("The obvious anticompetitive effect that triggers abbreviated
analysis has not been shown.").
(1 128 F.3d at 728.
110 119 S. Ct. at 1615 n. 12; see also id. at 1615 ("the court's adversion to empirical evidence
at the moment of this implicit burden-shifting underscores the leniency of its enquiry
into evidence of the restrictions' anticompetitive effects").
191 Id. at 1615 n.12 ("The point is that before a theoretical claim of anticompetitive
effects can justify shifting to a defendant the burden to show empirical evidence of
procompetitive effects, as quick-look analysis in effect requires, there must be some indica-
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Second, as has been noted by others, the Court used the word "plausi-
ble" five times.9 2 Thus, the Court said that "CDA's advertising restrictions
might plausibly be thought to have a net procompetitive effect";' 93 and
that the suggestion that CDA's rules might increase consumer informa-
tion "may or may not be correct, but it is not implausible."'' 9 4 A strongly
written amicus brief filed by the NCAA, which the Court presumably
read, had focused sharply on the word "plausible" and argued repeatedly
that "full rule-of-reason analysis must supersede the 'quick look' review
if the defendant presents a plausible procompetitive justification."'195 It
argued that the approach adopted by the Tenth Circuit in a case it had
lost and the "stepwise" approach advanced by AAGJoel Klein' 96 required
too much of defendants and could chill competition) 97 It is not absurd to
speculate that the Court, through its repeated mentioning of "plausible,"
might have bought into some of this reasoning-although, as is discussed
below, the Court deliberately refrained from going as far as amici desired.
Pro-defendant speculation is bolstered by the Supreme Court majori-
ty's somewhat brusque treatment of AAG Joel Klein. As noted, AAG
tion that the court making the decision has properly identified the theoretical basis for
the anticompetitive effects and considered whether the effects actually are anticompetitive.
Where, as here, the circumstances of the restriction are somewhat complex, assumption
alone will not do.").
192 See William J. Kolasky, California Dental Ass'n v. FTC: The New Antitrust Empiricism,
ANTITRUST, Fall 1999, at 68.
193 119 S. Ct. at 1613.
194 Id. at 1615; see also id. (court of appeals "indirectly acknowledged the plausibility of
procompetitive justifications"); id. at 1617 (criticizing the court of appeals for giving no
weight to an "at least equally plausible suggestion"); id. ("the plausibility of competing
claims about the effects of the proffessional advertising restrictions rules out the indulgently
abbreviated review to which the Commission's order was treated").
195 NCAA Amicus Brief, supra note 157, at 5; see also id. at 6 ("If a defendant can state
a facially platsible procompetitive justification for the challenged restraint, the 'quick
look' should be over and the restraint examined in full. A defendant should not have to
produce factual support sufficient to prevail after a full rule-of-reason analysis before the
plaintiff is put to its proof of actual anticompetitive effects."); id. at 16 ("a defendant can
terminate the 'quick look' and return to the full rule of reason by advancing a plausible
procompetitive justification for the challenged restraint"); see also Brief of the American
Dental Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, CDA, Dkt. 97-1625, at
20 n.10 [hereinafter ADA Amicus Brief] ("Other courts of appeals have faithfully followed
this Court's teaching that qtick-look analysis is inappropriate unless a restraint is inherently
suspect and unsupported by any procompetitive justification.").
The NCAA properly acknowledged its special interest as a party that had lost a flexible
rule of reason case, a phase of which continued. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir.
1998). The Supreme Court eventually denied the NCAA's petition for certiorari from that
decision. 119 S. Ct. 65 (1998).
196 See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
197 The SG disagreed and distinguished the cases on which the NCAA relied. "Neither
case suggests that an exhaustive market analysis is required whenever a defendant asserts
a procompetitive theory." SG Brief, supra note 64, at 34 n.27; see also Brief of the States
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Klein had weighed into the debates about structuring a rule of reason
inquiry with a speech that was the subject of a published point-counter-
point debate. To support its conclusion that the rule of reason "'is always
something of a sliding scale,"1 9 8 the Court observed that commentators
have expressed similar views, and cited a law review article and the anti-
DOJ "counterpoint."'199 The Court appended a "But see" citation to the
Klein "point," with a parenthetical that does not suggest disagreement
about the need for a sliding scale. 20
AAG Klein's "stepwise" approach to rule of reason analysis had been
called to the Court's attention several times during the term. The NCAA's
amicus brief and the "counterpoint" cited by the Court had criticized it
for too quickly forcing defendants to come forward with hard evidence
of procompetitive purposes.20' Earlier, in his opposition to CDA's petition
for certiorari, the Solicitor General had touted AAG Klein's "Point" as
"advocating a similar practical approach and citing the decision below
of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, CDA, No. 97-1625, at 19
(objecting to the suggestion that "a mere assertion of a pro-competitive justification by
the defendant should automatically require a thorough market analysis").
198 119 S. Ct. at 1617 (quoting PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAw 1507, at 402 (1986)).
199 Id. at 1617 n.15 (citing Kolasky, supra note 163, at 43; Thomas A. Piraino,Jr., Making
Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New Standard for Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. Rzv.
1753, 1771 (1994)).
200 119 S. Ct. at 1617 n. 15 ("But see Klein... (examination of procompetitivejustifications
'is by no means a full scrutiny of the proffered efficiency justification. It is, rather, a hard
look at the justification to determine if it meets the defendant's burden of coming forward
with-but not establishing-a valid efficiencyjustification.')."). In fact, Klein almost surely
agrees with the Court's observation that there is a sliding scale. Cf Klein, Stepwise Speech,
supra note 162, at 6 (the Court has "made clear that there is 'often no bright line separat-
[ing] per se from Rule of Reason analysis"' (quoting NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104 n.26) (brackets
by Klein)).
201 NCAA Amicus Brief, supra note 157, at 18 (citations omitted);
The "stepwise approach" now favored by the Antitrust Division also would
permit a summary finding of liability unless the defendant proves "with real world
evidence-factual evidence, expert economic evidence, or preferably both"-that
the restraint actually serves a procompetitive purpose.
This is too much. Requiring defendants to prove the benefits of their conduct
before plaintiffs show that conduct actually harms competition stands the procom-
petitive principles of the antitrust laws on their head. This burden-shifting stan-
dard presents a particularly acute risk of deterring innovative, proconsumer
collaboration.
Kolasky, supra note 163, at 43 ("The fundamental problem with the Department's stepwise
approach is that it proposes in the case of certain horizontal agreements to dispense with
a critical step of this analysis and to impose on the defendant the burden of proving 'with
real world evidence-factual evidence, expert economic evidence, or preferably both-'
that the restraint serves a procompetitive purpose, even in the absence of any showing that
the restraint is likely to cause any substantial harm to competition.") (citations omitted).
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with approval."2 2 Yet, earlier in the term, the SG had relied on AAG
Klein's "Stepwise" approach as justifying the Second Circuit's decision
in Discon v. NYNEX 2°3 and making certiorari unwarranted. 20 4 The Court
had apparently disagreed, since it granted certiorari and unanimously
vacated the judgment.205 Especially in light of all the attention that AAG
Klein's "Stepwise" approach attracted this term, the Court's odd "But
see" citation of Klein's "Point" and its favorable citation of the opposing
"Counterpoint" suggest some discomfort with Klein's approach, at least
as it was portrayed by its critics.
C. A SETBACK FOR MARKET POWER SCREENS
Although many specific points in the Court's opinion can provide
comfort to critics of the "quick look," undue attention to these should
not distract from the central lesson of CDA. From the beginning, CDA
was about market power. CDA's counsel litigated this case by arguing
that first Complaint Counsel and then the Commission must lose because
no F1C economist expert had been called, no localized markets had
been defined, and no entry barriers had been precisely calibrated. CDA
asked the Commission, the Ninth Circuit, and then the Supreme Court
to rule in its favor on grounds of failure to prove market power. Because
202 Brief for the Federal Trade Commission in Opposition to Certiorari, CDA, Dkt. 97-
1625, at 20. The SG's subsequent brief refrained from citing Klein.
203 93 F.3d 1055 (2d Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded, 525 U.S. 128 (1998).
204 Brief for the United States and the FTC as Amici Curiae, NYNEX Corp. v. Discon,
Inc., No. 96-1570 (1998) (opposing certiorari) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1600/
1612.htm>. The SC agreed that the Second Circuit was mistaken when it suggested that
Kor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), could make certain non-
horizontal boycotts per se illegal, but he rationalized the Second Circuit's outcome as a
proper application of a version of the rule of reason:
[T]he approach suggested by the court of appeals here is consistent with that
suggested by this Court's opinions in [Indiana Federation of Dentists and NCAA].
In those cases, the court indicated that, once the defendants' conduct has been
shown to be anticompetitive based on its character or its effects, the conduct will
be deemed to be unreasonable without any extensive market analysis, unless the
defendants advance an adequate procompetitive justification.
Brief at 16. The SG cited AAG Klein's "Stepwise" speech and added that the Division "uses
such an approach to analyze certain types of horizontal restraints." Id. at 17.
The SG's suggestion and AAG Klein's "Stepwise" approach were criticized as "turning
the ordinary antitrust burden of proof upside down." Brief of Amicus Curiae GTE Corp.
in Support of Petitioners, NYNEX Corp., No. 96-1570, at 13.
205 NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998) (only horizontal group boycotts
can be illegal per se). In his brief on the merits, the SG supported vacating the judgment
and limiting K/or's to horizontal group boycotts. Brief for the United States and the FTC
as Amici Curiae in Support of Vacating the Judgment, NYNEX Corp., No. 96-1570. The
brief does not cite AAG Klein's writings.
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understanding the extent to which the CDA litigation was about the role
of market power is important to understanding the Court's opinion,
that litigation is discussed in some detail before the Court's opinion is
discussed directly.
1. Market Power in the CDA Litigation
CDA's appellate strategy at the Commission, in the Ninth Circuit, and
even in the Supreme Court was audaciously simple. First, it read ALJ
Parker's findings that CDA lacked market power, and that Complaint
Counsel had thus failed to satisfy the rule of reason,2 6 for all they were
worth. It treated the reportorial "Findings" 322 and 32627 not as mere
recitation of what a defense expert had said, but as though ALJ Parker
had adopted Professor Knox's conclusions as his own and found that
competition had not been affected. Once that transformation had been
accomplished, CDA's argument seemed overwhelming: How could the
Commission condemn something that the ALJ had found (1) had been
adopted by an association with no market power and (2) had had no
effect on competition?
(a) At the Commission
It is hard to overemphasize the centrality of Judge Parker's purported
findings about market power and competitive effect to CDA's written
and oral presentations to the Commission. Market power was the first
point CDA addressed at argument. 208 The principal thrust of CDA's brief
was that Judge Parker had found market power to be absent, so CDA
should win. CDA's appellate brief discusses its claimed lack of market
power on 26 of the first 31 pages of its argument. 2 9 The first Argument
heading announces that "The Rule of Reason Is The Applicable Analysis
In This Case," and that heading occupies 31 of the 52 argument pages
not addressed to jurisdiction. 210 CDA's appellate brief quoted both Find-
ings 322 and 326 in their entirety (omitting the words "Professor Knox
206 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
207 Supra note 14. The finding of no market power was supported by what counsel
characterized as the ALJ's finding of "no impact on competition." Commission Transcript,
supra note 91, at 12.
2108 The "three contentions" CDA's counsel sought to establish at oral argument are
quoted supra text at note 94.
2109 CDA Commission Brief, supra note 87, at 3, 5, 7, 8-10, 12, 13, 14-16, 18-25, 28-34.
210 Id. at i. Subheadings include "CDA's Activities Cannot Be 'Inherently Suspect' Because
CDA Does Not Possess And Cannot Exercise Market Power," "The ALJ's Finding That
CDA Lacks Market Power Refutes The Complaint's Anticompetitive Theory," "The ALJ's
Citation of Mass. Board ... Is Inapposite Because Market Power Was Present in Mass.
Board," and ". . . The Commission Should State Explicitly That There Is a Market
Power Screen."
[Vol. 67
CALIFORNIA DENTAL ASSOCIATION
testified") four different times,211 and quoted or paraphrased one of
them an additional fifteen times. 21 2 CDA's reply brief continued the
overwhelming emphasis on the claimed lack of market power. Ten out
of the fourteen headings in the Reply Brief relate to market power.213
CDA claimed that Complaint Counsel had failed to call an economist
expert and was asking the Commission to relieve them of the conse-
quences of that decision. 214 Also featured again were Judge Parker's
purported findings of no competitive effect, which were featured as
blocked quotations twice 215 and quoted or paraphrased an additional
five times.216
211 Id. at 8-9 ("Based on the testimony of CDA's economic expert, Dr. Robert Knox,
Judge Parker made the following findings of fact: e '[T]hat CDA's enforcement of its
Code of Ethics with respect to advertising has no negative impact on competition .... ) (empha-
sis added by CDA's counsel) (footnote appended to "Knox" notes that "The economic
testimony of Dr. Knox is unrebutted."); 14-15 ('judge Parker made the following findings
of fact: * '[t] hat CDA's enforcement of its Code of Ethics with respect to advertising has
no negative impact on competition .... ") (emphasis added by CDA's counsel); 27; 33-34.
212 Id. at 5, 7, 10, 12 (twice), 19, 21, 24 n.6, 27, 28, 35 (three times); 53, 83.
213 CDA Commission Reply Brief, supra note 90, at i-ii.
214 Id. at 6:
At trial, Complaint Counsel elected not to call an economist to offer expert
testimony concerning whether and to what extent CDA possessed market power,
entry barriers, or the effects, if any, of CDA's activities in a properly-defined
market. Complaint Counsel could have called the economist they designated as
their expert prior to trial, Dr.John E. Kwoka, if they believed his testimony would
support their anticompetitive theory. Significantly, Complaint Counsel refused
to present Dr. Kwoka for a deposition and withdrew Dr. Kwoka from their witness
list at trial. That was Complaint Counsel's prerogative.
215 Id. at 15 (Finding 322), 26 (Findings 322 & 326).
216 Id. at 6, 19, 22, 28, 31. CDA's counsel justified its misquotation of Judge Parker's
reporting of testimony (by the omitting of the words "Professor Knox testified") as follows
(quoted in its entirety, with emphasis in the original):
Realizing that Judge Parker's Findings of Fact with respect to the unrebutted
economic evidence devastate their case, Complaint Counsel attempt to dismiss
these findings as merely recounting the testimony of CDA's economic expert.
(CAB at 64 n.50.) Apparently, Complaint Counsel take the disingenuous position
that Judge Parker's Findings of Fact are irrelevant and superfluous padding
mysteriously appended to the Initial Decision for no useful purpose. Of course,
it would serve no purpose to recount the testimony of a particular witness in a
Finding of Fact except to find that that testimony constituted a fact. Moreover,
it is clear thatJudge Parker did not merely restate testimony in his Findings Fact
that he considered unsupported or irrelevant. Judge Parker's Findings of Fact
with respect to the testimony of Dr. Knox are based on findings proposed by
CDA. (Compare F. 322-327 with RPF 288-294, 297-298, 300-308.) As the Initial
Decision explains on its first page:
This decision is based on the transcript of the testimony, the exhibits which
I have received in evidence, and the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law and answers thereto filed by the parties. I have adopted several proposed findings
verbatim. Others have been adopted in substance. All other findings are rejected
either because they are not supported by the record or because they are irrel-
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(b) In the Ninth Circuit
In the Ninth Circuit, CDA attacked the Commission for what CDA
claimed was its extension of the per se rule and for its failure to apply
the full-blown rule of reason.1 7 CDA summarized its argument as follows:
The practices challenged by the Commission must be analyzed under
the traditional rule of reason analysis. The elements of a rule of rea-
son analysis, as recently set forth in American Ad Management, 1996
U.S.App.LEXIS at *18-25, require a definition of the relevant product
and geographic markets and an evaluation of the challenged practices'
effect on competition in those markets. Id. at 24-25. The Commission
made no effort to define the relevant market. More importantly, the
ALJ explicitly found that CDA's challenged practices have "no impact
on competition in any market in the State of California, particularly
with respect to price and output." ER14, # 326. The FTC staff presented
no economic testimony at trial and thus, there is a marked absence of
any expert or other testimony sustaining the Commission's theory.218
CDA's argument with respect to non-discount advertising was especially
simple: Once the Commission conceded that this was not a "naked
restraint on price or output," it was required (according to CDA) to
proceed with a full-blown rule of reason. 219
Once again, CDA repeatedly pointed to what it claimed was its lack
of market power.220 CDA strongly criticized Complaint Counsel for offer-
ing no economics expert at trial.22 Also, once again, CDA relied heavily
on its tactic of omitting the words "Professor Knox testified" in order to
evan t.
(ID at 1) (emphasis supplied). When one compares Judge Parker's Findings of
Fact with CDA's proposed findings it is clear that, with respect to the testimony
of Dr. Knox,Judge Parker adopted certain of CDA's proposed findings verbatim,
that he adopted the substance of others, and that he declined to adopt other
findings or portions thereof.
Id. at 31-32.
I17 CDA's briefs first three headings said that (1) use of the per se rule was error, (2)
"applying a 'quick-look' analysis" was error, and (3) CDA did not violate "the traditional
rule of reason" because its activities "have no anticompetitive effect" and "there can be
no antitrust violation in view of low entry barriers." CDA Ninth Circuit Brief, supra note 7.
218 Id. at 20. See also Reply Brief of Petitioner California Dental Ass'n in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at 13 (No. 96-70409) [hereinafter CDA Ninth
Circuit Reply Brief] ("Under the traditional rule of reason analysis, the FTC must define
a relevant market, properly analyze entry conditions in the market, and establish an adverse
effect on competition.").
219 CDA Ninth Circuit Brief, supra note 7, at 44.
220 Id. at 2, 6, 7-8, 10, 20, 24, 45, 50-54.
221 Id. at 20 (summary of argument); 48 ("Prior to trial, the FTC withdrew their only
economist designated as a witness from their witness list and the FTC presented no
economic testimony at trial."); CDA Ninth Circuit Reply Brief, supra note 218, at 5 n.2
("the FTC failed to call any economist as a witness").
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transform an ALJ report of testimony into an independent ALJ finding
of no effect on competition. 222 In its reply brief, CDA reemphasized its
claimed lack of market power, attacked the use of the per se rule, 2 3
attacked the Commission for "Applying A 'Quick-Look' Analysis to CDA's
Ethical Provisions Concerning Advertising, 224 and criticized the Commis-
sion for failing formally to define a relevant market 225 and finding a
violation when entry barriers are low. 2
26
(c) In the Supreme Court
In the Supreme Court, CDA was not shy about what it sought on the
antitrust part of the case: the Full Monty. The relevant section of its
brief is captioned, "CDA's Conduct Should Have Been Judged Under A
Full Rule of Reason Analysis. 227 CDA argued that a "full rule of reason
analysis is necessary in most instances," including this one.228 It continued
to alter quotations in order to claim that the ALJ had found that CDA's
activities had no negative effect.229 CDA concluded where it began:
"Advertising requirements promulgated by professional associations
directed at potentially misleading and unverifiable claims, such as those at
issue here, should be prohibited only upon a showing of anticompetitive
effect after a full rule of reason analysis. ' 230 In its reply brief, too, CDA
again called for application of the "full blown rule of reason.
'
"231
222 Altered findings 322 and 326 were featured as centered quotations once each, CDA
Ninth Circuit Brief, supra note 7, at 6-7, and were quoted or paraphrased at least an
additional nine times, id. at 2, 8, 18, 20, 37, 39, 46, 51 & 55. Finding 322 also was once
featured as a centered quotation with the words "Professor Knox testified" retained. Id.
at 47. In its Reply Brief, CDA again featured altered but otherwise full quotations, CDA
Ninth Circuit Reply Brief, supra note 218, at 2-3, and quoted or paraphrased this language
twice, id. at 14 & 23. As it had before the Commission, CDA defended its misquoting of
the ALJ's reportorial findings concerning expert witness Knox by arguing that "[t] he ALJ
clearly adopted that portion of Professor Knox's testimony contained in his findings." Id.
at 19.
223 Id. at 8-13.
224 Id. at 13-17.
221 Id. at 18-21.
226 Id. at 21-22.
227 CDA Supreme Court Brief, supra note 104, at iii.
228 Id. at 32.
221 One or both of the Findings of Fact 322 and 326 were quoted in full (except for the
mention that the thoughts were Professor Knox's) twice, id. at 7 & 27, and were quoted
or paraphrased an additional eight times, see id. at 2 (the antitrust issue in the case is said
to be whether "a prohibition against false and misleading advertising, which has been
affirmatively found to have no impact on competition, [can] nonetheless violate the
antitrust laws"), id. at 13, 15 (twice), 41-44.
2I Id. at 41.
231 CDA Supreme Court Reply Brief, supra note 64, at Heading II.B.
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2. The Supreme Court's Response to CDA's Plea to Require
Formal Proof of Market Power
The market power issue was starkly posed at the very end of the
Supreme Court oral argument when Justice Scalia observed, "I don't
understand how there can be an anti-competitive effect when there is
no market power." 23 2 CDA's position was that anticompetitive effects
cannot occur without market power, and, accordingly, the complaint
should be dismissed. CDA asked the Supreme Court to agree that the
Commission and the Ninth Circuit had erred by failing to engage in a
full-blown rule of reason, including detailed, formal measurement of
market power.23
This the Supreme Court refused to do. The Court directed scrutiny
not to market power, but to the particular practices in which CDA
had engaged. The Court reviewed a series of reasons why professional
advertising raises special issues, and criticized the Ninth Circuit for giving
insufficient attention to CDA's "plausible" justifications. 214
The Court conspicuously did not call for examination of market power.
The Court cited with apparent approval two "quick look" opinions that
had eschewed formal measurement of market power.235 (One of those
opinions had been strongly attacked in an amicus brief as having
"remove[d] the calculus of anticompetitive effects from the rule of rea-
son. "236) Nowhere is the Commission faulted for any failure formally to
define product and geographic markets, to measure entry barriers, to
calculate market shares, and the like. To the contrary, the Court specifi-
cally rejected that approach:
Saying here that the Court of Appeals's conclusion at least required a
more extended examination of the possible factual underpinnings than
it received is not, of course, necessarily to call for the fullest market
analysis. Although we have said that a challenge to a "naked restraint
on price and output" need not be supported by "a detailed market
analysis" in order to "requir[e] some competitive justification," it does
not follow that every case attacking a less obviously anticompetitive
restraint (like this one) is a candidate for plenary market examination.
The truth is that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are
less fixed than terms like "per se," "quick look," and "rule of reason"
232 Justice Scalia was echoing a theme associated with, among othersJudge Easterbrook.
See supra note 128.
233 See supra Part IV.C.1.
234 See supra Part III.B.
235 119 S. Ct. at 1613 (citing Law v. NCAA and Chicago Professional Sports, which are
discussed supra text at notes 170-76).
216 NCAA Amicus Brief, supra note 157, at 12.
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tend to make them appear .... There is always something of a sliding
scale in appraising reasonableness .. 237
More generally, the Court did not employ the language that is associ-
ated with an economics-oriented emphasis on the primacy of formal
proof of market power.238 In its summary of Indiana Federation of Dentists,
the Court described it as a case in which conspirators agreed "to withhold
a particular desired service" 239g-not, as sometimes happens, as a case in
which there had been proof of actual harm to competition. The Court's
non-economics-oriented approach is typified by its declaration that "false
or misleading advertising has an anticompetitive effect, as that term is
customarily used. 240 The Court said that this proposition "has long been
established," citing FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., a venerable FTC false
advertising case that the Court hadn't cited in more than thirty years. 241
Algoma Lumber, which was decided at a time when the FTC Act prohibited
only "unfair methods of competition, 24 2 held that itwas illegal to mislabel
products in substantial part because "[d]ealers and manufacturers are
prejudiced when order that would have come to them if the lumber
[the product at issue] had been rightly named."243 The Court's assertion
that false advertising is anticompetitive was notably devoid of any qualifi-
cations about prices or output, let alone market power. Indeed, Algoma
Lumber expressed concern about mislabeling prejudicing affected com-
petitors even if consumers receive lower prices: "Fair competition is not
attained by balancing a gain in money against a misrepresentation of
237 119 S. Ct. at 1617 (citation to NCAA omitted) (quoting PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST
LAw § 1507, at 402 (1986)).
231 The one point on which the Court took a more economics-oriented approach con-
cerned non-discount advertising. In response to the Ninth Circuit's suggestion that prevent-
ing the promoting of patient comfort may affect output because fewer consumers would
obtain non-emergency care, the Court observed that "restricting such advertising would
reduce the demand for dental services, not the supply; and it is of course the producers'
supply of a good in relation to demand that is normally relevant in determining whether
a producer-imposed output limitation has the anticompetitive effect of artificially raising
prices." 119 S. Ct. at 1616.
239 Id. at 1612; see also id. at 1613 (same).
2140 Id. at 1613 n.9; see also id. at 1615 (reference to possibility that any "costs to competition"
from CDA's rules might be "outweighed by gains to consumer information (and hence com-
petition)").
211 Id. at 1613 n.9 (citing, with a "cf.," FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 79-80
(1934)); cf FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 380 (1965) (most recent case
previously to cite Algoma Lumber).
2412 In response to the Court's decision in FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931), that
a deceptive practice was not illegal unless it had the requisite connection with competition,
Congress overruled the case through the 1938 Wheeler-Lea Amendments, Act of March
21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, which extended the FTC Act to cover "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices."
2143 291 U.S. at 78.
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the thing supplied." 4  As it had in its decision earlier in the same term,
NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc.,245 the Court comfortably relied upon an.
opinion from an earlier, less economically sophisticated era.
V. IN PRAISE OF THE SLIDING SCALE
CDA is both a call for use of a "sliding scale" of antitrust analysis and
a striking example of why such an approach makes sense. The CDA
litigation is replete with examples of the problems created by clever
formulas. It is an object lesson in the law of unintended consequences
as it might apply to well-meant efforts to structure analyses.
A. "INHERENTLY SUSPECT"?
The potential problem created by Mass. Board4 6 is obvious in the ALJ's
Initial Decision. Any candid observer would have to admit that the ALJ
did too much applying of the rubric of Mass. Board and too little critical
thinking. When he had declared that CDA had no market power, he
should have rethought his conclusion, not simply ended his opinion.
Simply as a matter of judicial craftsmanship and engagement in the
issues, the opinion is disappointing. It is odd, at best, to make findings
about an issue (market power) and then to conclude that its resolution
is irrelevant. If ALJs are going to condemn a practice they find lawful
under the rule of reason, they should be careful about it. It is one thing
to proceed to condemn a restraint when one is uncertain about market
power; it is quite another to condemn a restraint when one has concluded
that market power is absent.
The problem was not just with the ALJ. Both sides struggled to show
why CDA's conduct is or is not within the Mass. Board pigeonhole of
"inherently suspect," whereas they might better have spent the time
and space analyzing likely competitive effect. Of the CDA briefs pages
devoted to the principal substantive issue, a majority were addressed to
the ALJ's application of Mass. Board.24 7 Complaint Counsel discussed
empirical evidence about the kinds of advertisements California dentists
ran only in response to Commission questioning.2 48 Most of his argument
244 Id.
21-1 19 S. Ct. 493, 497 (1998) (Breyer, J.) (unanimous opinion that discusses without
reservation the application of the per se rule in Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v.
FI'C, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), and Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959)
(which the Court read as a horizontal boycott case)).
246 See supra text accompanying note 158.
247 CDA Commission Brief, supra note 87, at ii-iii ("The ALJ's Application of Mass.
Board is Erroneous;" "CDA's Activities Are Not 'Inherently Suspect.' ").
24' See supra note 91.
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responded to CDA's arguments by attempting to show why the ALJ's
finding of no market power was both wrong and non-dispositive.
With hindsight, of course, we know that time spent specifically on
Mass. Board may not have been time spent to best advantage. Even had
the Commission fully applied Mass. Board, however, it likely would have
profited from the parties' spending less time on the applicability of that
structure and more time on the underlying issues. One problem with
elegant structures erected by smart men and women is that they are often
replaced by other structures erected by their equally smart successors.
B. "NAKED RESTRAINTS"?
As discussed above, the search for a middle category of analysis is
often associated with NCAA. In particular, the Court in NCAA said it was
applying the rule of of reason but that a "naked restraint on price and
output requires some competitive justification even in the absence of a
detailed market analysis." 49 Given NCAA's association with the "quick
look," this has led to the suggestion that the "quick look" is available
only for "naked restraints," with all other restraints being analyzed under
the full-blown rule of reason. Of course parties to what is truly a naked
restraint on price and output should be subjected to the per se rule,
because the arrangement would "always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and reduce output. ' 250 The only way to read NCAA sensibly
is to presume that the Court actually was referring to arrangements that
are perilously close to ones that are per se illegal.
The problem with the idea that non-naked restraints must be subject
to the full-blown rule of reason was nicely illustrated in the CDA litigation.
The Commission ruled that for CDA's restraints on non-price advertising
it could "say with equal confidence that, as a facial matter, CDA's concerns
are unrelated to the public service aspect of its profession, or that 'the
practice facially appears to be one that would always or almost always
tend to restrict competition and decrease output.' "251 The Commission
concluded that accordingly it would be cautious and apply the rule of
reason, rather than the per se rule. CDA cried "gotcha!" and argued to the
Ninth Circuit that the Commission had "conceded that CDA's activities
concerning nonprice advertising do not constitute the sort of 'naked
restraint on price or output that would justify a 'quick look.' Under the
2149 468 U.S. at 110.
250 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979).
251 121 F.T.C. at 307-08 (quoting BMI, 441 U.S. at 19-20).
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circumstances, the Commission erred as a matter of law in applying a
'quick look' to CDA's activities. 2 52
This kind of argument does antitrust no good. Although one can
decipher what the Court meant in NCAA, it is not wholly unreasonable
for litigants to point to what the Court said. With all respect to the Court,
the idea that a naked restraint could be subject both to the per se rule
and to some other form of analysis never made good sense and has
caused mischief.
C. "QuIcK LOOK"?
The term "quick look" is itself unfortunate. It is both a term of art
and an ordinary phrase, which is always problematic. Even as a term of
art it has multiple uses. As discussed above, it has been used to refer to
a court's pausing to reflect before applying the per se rule (sort of a
"thoughtful per se rule"). This was the sense in which Judge Posner used
the term in Vogel and General Leaseways. 251 It has also been used as a term
of art to refer to a situation in which a court is comfortable concluding
that a restraint is anticompetitive without engaging in a full-scale rule
of reason review. This was the sense in which the term was used, for
instance, in Law v. NCAA. 254 With either meaning, the point of the "quick
look" is that a conclusion can be reached without engaging in a merger-
type analysis-the Full Monty. Since it is comprised of ordinary words,
the term "quick look" also can be used with an ordinary-language mean-
ing, i.e., briefly considering something.
Hindsight, however, makes clear that the Commission never should
have used the phrase "quick look." In context, it is apparent that the
Commission must have meant merely the term-of-art signal that it was
proceeding without full-blown, merger-type, precise measurement of
localized market shares. After all, the Commission was proceeding after
trial, with the benefit of a lengthy Initial Decision, after full oral argument
and briefing, and with substantial opinions.255 Unfortunately for the
252 CDA Ninth Circuit Brief, supra note 7, at 44 (citation to American Ad Management
omitted).
25 Vogel v. American Soc'y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1984); General Lease-
ways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1984); see supra text at
notes 167-69.
254 Lawv. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998) (discussed supra text accompanying
notes 175-76).
255 The Supreme Court noted approvingly that Justice Breyer had written 14 pages
compared with the Ninth Circuit's 8. 119 S. Ct. at 1617. This must have been an apples
and oranges comparison, since the Ninth Circuit used 8 pages of F.3d, whereas Justice
Breyer used only just over 6 pages of the Supreme Court Reporter (Justice Souter used
101/2). But Judge Parker, Chairman Pitofsky, and dissenting Commissioner Azcuenaga
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Commission, its opinion occasionally may seem to use "quick look" to
refer to an overall abbreviating of the rule of reason and various parts
thereof.2 6 In context, it is clear that the Commission meant merely that
any rule of reason analysis should be of appropriate length, 25 7 but the
Commission unfortunately described its analysis as "simple and short, '25 8
which was neither accurate nor helpful on appeal.
The Ninth Circuit appears to have understood that the Commission
used the phrase "quick look" as a term of art that describes rule of
reason treatment without formal merger-type market power analysis. 259
When it examined the evidence supporting the Commission's decisions
on the four key issues (agreement, intent, effect, and market power),
the Ninth Circuit referred to the "quick look" only in connection with
each wrote enough pages in the FTC Reports (79, 50, and 291/2, respectively) to win any
quantity-based contest, even after one adjusts for the fewer words on a page of the
FTC Reports.
256 In an introductory overview of antitrust analysis, the Commission observed that the
rule of reason "enquiry need not be conducted in great depth and elaborate detail in
every case, for sometimes a court may be able to determine the anticompetitive character
of a restraint easily and quickly by what has come to be known as a 'quick look' review."
121 F.T.C. at 298 (citing Indiana Federation of Dentists and NCAA). To the same effect, the
Commission added that the full-blown rule of reason review "can take place expeditiously
under a 'quick look' approach." Id. at 299. And in its conclusion, the Commission observed
that CDA's non-price restraints "are entitled to a quick look under an individualized
examination of the competitive benefits and burdens they entail." Id. at 333.
257 Immediately before it began its detailed scrutiny of the conduct at issue and its
context, the Commission explained what it would be doing:
The Supreme Court has made clear that the rule of reason contemplates
a flexible inquiry, examining a challenged restraint in the detail necessary to
understand its competitive effect. As will be seen, here, application of the rule
of reason is simple and short. The anticompetitive effects of CDA's advertising
restrictions are sufficiently clear, and the claimed efficiencies sufficiently tenuous,
that a detailed analysis of market power is unnecessary to reaching a sound
conclusion, and, in any event, CDA clearly had sufficient power to inflict competi-
tive harm.
121 F.T.C. at 308 (citation to NCAA omitted). Although the alliterative "simple and short"
may suggest inaccurately that the Commission did not devote substantial time and thought
to the matter, the discussion of market power makes clear that the Commission was really
just explaining why it found unavailing CDA's claim that the Commission shouldn't proceed
without requiring Complaint Counsel to retain a testifying economist who could help
define scores of localized geographic markets.
258 Id. at 308.
259 128 F.3d at 727 (citation omitted):
In this case, the FIC applied an abbreviated, or "quick look," rule of reason
analysis designed for restraints that are not per se unlawful but are sufficiently
anticompetitive on their face that they do not require a full-blown rule of reason
inquiry. See NCAA ("The essential point is that the rule of reason can sometimes
be applied in the twinkling of an eye."). It allows the condemnation of a "naked
restraint" on price or output without an "elaborate industry analysis."
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its discussion of market power.260 Unfortunately, the court also used the
phrase "quick look" imprecisely. It wrote that CDA's "possible justifica-
tion" of preventing false and misleading price advertising does not
"require more than a quick look" because CDA prohibited all across-
the-board discounts and "the record provides no evidence that the [CDA]
rule has in fact led to increased disclosure and transparency of dental
pricing." 261 In context, the court must have meant that the justification
CDA had presented to it was obviously deficient, but by succumbing to
the lure of the phrase "quick look," the court left itself open to criticism
by CDA, its allies, and eventually the Supreme Court majority. By giving
the impression that the Ninth Circuit or the Commission had been casual
in its consideration of CDA's claimed justification, the Ninth Circuit left
itself open to attack.
Counsel opposed to the Commission inevitably excoriated the Com-
mission and the Ninth Circuit for proceeding with unseemly haste, and
the Supreme Court seems to have been persuaded that the analysis below
did notjust scrimp on merger-type market analysis but omitted minimally
necessary thought and consideration. Thus, the Court wrote that "adver-
tising restrictions arguably protecting patients from misleading or irrele-
vant advertising call for more than cursory treatment."26 2 The Court
criticized what it called "the indulgently abbreviated review to which the
Commission's order was treated. ' 263 Giving the phrase "quick look" its
ordinary English-language meaning, the Court favorably compared Jus-
tice Breyer's dissent to the court of appeals's opinion, and, even counting
pages (14 to 8), observed that his "treatment of the antitrust issues here
is no 'quick look.' Lingering is more like it .... ,,264 Indeed, the Court's
final conclusion is that "a less quick look was required. 265
This free-form mixing of a phrase's ordinary meaning and the special-
ized sense in which it was used is a reminder of the mischief that can
come when words or phrases have multiple meanings. The Commission
may have focused on arguments CDA was presenting to it, and not the
261 Id. at 729-30 ("Although the Commission did not engage in a detailed analysis of
market power, ... we conclude that they [its conclusions] suffice under the quick look
rule of reason in light of the nature of the restraints involved.... Given the facially
anticompetitive nature of both the price and nonprice advertising restrictions, the evidence
of the CDA's large market share and influence justifies finding a violation under the quick
look rule of reason.").
261 Id. at 728.
262 119 S. Ct. at 1614.
263 Id. at 1617.
264 Id.
261 Id. at 1618.
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arguments that would eventually appeal to the Court; this was not a matter
of haste, but rather simply litigation realities. Although Commissioner
Azcuenaga rather strenuously attacked the Commission's fact finding,
the law is clear that the majority's fact finding is owed deference, and
no appellate judge showed an interest in questioning the evidence sup-
porting the Commission's findings. But because the Commission pro-
ceeded with what it described as a "quick look," the Court seemed willing
to assume without much evidence that the Commission and the Ninth
Circuit had acted too quickly.
D. "ON ITS FACE"?
Two seemingly unremarkable propositions were juxtaposed in CDA,
with the result that the analysis was unnecessarily confused. The first is
the concept of the facial unreasonableness of a practice. From time to
time, courts direct attention to what agreements accomplish "on their
face." Professional Engineers ruled that "[o]n its face, this agreement
restrains trade within the meaning of § 1 of the Sherman Act. 266 Broadcast
Music directed our attention, when deciding whether to apply the per
se rule, to whether a restraint "facially appears to be one that would always
or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output. 26 7 The
Ninth Circuit wrote that the FTC had applied a "quick look" rule of
reason "designed for restraints that are not per se unlawful but are
sufficiently anticompetitive on their face that they do not require a full-
blown rule of reason inquiry."2 68 Since agreements that may be plainly
anticompetitive may be written or unwritten, "facially" must be meant
figuratively to refer to the plain sense of an arrangement. 269
The second proposition was that a document may be written one way
and enforced another. The Ninth Circuit observed that "[o]n its face,
the [CDA] Code only extends to false and misleading advertisements. '" 270
266 435 U.S. at 693.
267 441 U.S. at 19-20. The Commission wrote, about non-price restraints, that it "cannot
say with equal confidence that, as a facial matter, CDA's concerns are unrelated to the
public service aspect of its profession, or that 'the practice facially appears .... " 121
F.T.C. at 307.
265 128 F.3d at 727 (citing NCAA).
269 Cf BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 236 (1987) ("Face,"
in "on its face," "refers to the inscribed side of a document. It means 'in the words of, in
the plain sense of'. . . . The phrase is sometimes used figuratively of things other than
documents. E.g., 'A libel is harmful on its face."'). That antitrust "facial unreasonableness"
does not really refer to the words of a document was understood by Professor Areeda:
The inelegant phrase, reminiscent of facially unconstitutional statutes, may seem
to focus attention on the words on the face of an agreement. Rather, [United
States v. Realty Multi-List, 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980)] meant that judgments
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It agreed with the Commission, however, that "through its [CDA's] pat-
tern of enforcement," which included advisory opinions and guidelines,
"CDA went beyond the literal language of its rules to prohibit ads that
were in fact true and nondeceptive." 271 The Commission had said the
same thing without using the words "on its face. '272 Earlier in its opinion
the Ninth Circuit wrote another version of the same observation, as part
of the discussion of its decision not to apply the per se rule: "Unlike
the situation in AMA and Mass. Board, the CDA's policies do not, on
their face, ban truthful, nondeceptive ads. The allegation is that the
rules have been enforced in a way that restricts truthful advertising. "273
In this litigation, CDA's counsel blurred the two propositions. Citing
the Ninth Circuit's observation about CDA's policies "on their face"
not banning truthful, nondeceptive advertising, it argued that "CDA's
advertising guidelines are procompetitive on their face. 274 It also argued
that "the lower courts have held that the abbreviated rule of reason is
appropriate only where conduct is 'on its face' a restraint on price or
output for which there is no procompetitive justification." 275 It warned
about the risk of expanding the "quick look" to "conduct that is not
facially anticompetitive. ' '276
The Supreme Court, as part of its explanation of why the majority
disagreed with the dissent, wrote that CDA's advertising restrictions "are,
at least on their face, designed to avoid false or deceptive advertising. "277
What is unclear is the sense in which the phrase "on their face" is used.
If the Court meant "as written, without worrying about the reality," one
wonders why that should be the touchstone. If the Court meant "looking
to the plain sense of the arrangement," the Court was finding facts
can sometimes be made on the basis of the parties' arguments in the light of what
the judges know about the economy and in the light of such modes information as
may be available at the beginning of the lawsuit.
7 AREEDA, supra note 173, at 405.
270 128 F.3d at 729.
271 Id. at 729 (footnote omitted).
272 121 F.T.C. at 301 ("Although this may sound like an innocuous regulation that does
no more than enhance the truthfulness of the information conveyed, in its enforcement
CDA effectively precluded advertising that characterized a dentist's fees as being low,
reasonable, or affordable, as well as advertising of across-the-board discounts."); cf id. at
340, 342, 347, 352 (Azcuenaga, Comm'r, dissenting) (CDA's code is unobjectionable "on
its face").
271 128 F.3d at 727.
274 CDA Supreme Court Brief, supra note 104, at 33.
275 Id. at 32 (quoting from three opinions that discuss limiting the "quick look" but that
do not refer to examining restraints "on their face").
276 Id. at 45.
277 119 S. Ct. at 1613.
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inconsistent with those found by the Commission, without making clear
why it was doing so. Either way, it was unhelpful to have the Ninth Circuit
use "on their face" in two different ways.
E. "PLAUSIBLE EFFICIENCIES"?
In CDA the Supreme Court was invited to hold that whenever a defen-
dant can point to "facially plausible" efficiencies, scrutiny of its actions
must proceed under the full-blown rule of reason-the Full Monty.2 78
The Court refrained from doing so. The issue is sufficiently important
that it deserves attention, both for what the Court did and for why the
invitation deserved to go unaccepted.
Consider what the Court was asked to do. It was asked to let what
was admittedly a "modest showing" 79 have major consequences. Mere
assertion of a "plausible" efficiency justification would trigger a review
process in which the outcome was statistically extremely likely to be
favorable to defendant. The low standard posed by "plausible" is made
clear by contrasting "plausible" with what would be a slightly less indul-
gent standard, "credible": "[Pilausible applies to that which at first glance
appears to be true, reasonable, valid, etc. but which may or may not be
so.... [a plausible argument]; credible is used of that which is believable
because it is supported by evidence, sound logic, etc. [a credible
account]. ' ' 280 "Plausible" is derived from the Latin for "deserving
applause;" "credible" from the Latin for "to believe. '281 Yet the Court
was asked to let the assertion of any "plausible"justification trigger'full-
blown rule of reason review.
The Court did not accept the invitation. Nowhere did it suggest that
plausibility (which it does repeatedly mention 282) should result in the
merger-type measurement of market power. Rather than shifting atten-
tion from effects to power, it called for increased attention to effects.
What was needed was further examination of "the theoretical basis for
the anticompetitive effects" and consideration of "whether the effects
actually are anticompetitive. ' '283 Nor is there reason to believe the Court
meant by this indirectly to invite attention to market power.284
278 See supra Part IV.C.1 (c).
279 NCAA Amicus Brief, supra note 157, at 16.
280 WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1091 (2d College Ed. 1982).
281 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1993).
282 See supra notes 192-94.
283 119 S. Ct. at 1615 n.12.
2m See supra Part IV.C.2.
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By declining to let mere plausibility make such a major difference,
the Court fit comfortably with precedent. The lower court cases associ-
ated with the "quick look" considered far more than merely whether
proffered justifications seem proper at first glance, although they "may
or may not be. 285 Indeed,Judges Posner's or Easterbrook's "quick looks"
might well pass for another judge's "sedulous" ones.
The Supreme Court understood that the essential need is a sense of
proportion. At issue here were three factors: (1) the strength of Com-
plaint Counsel's showing that the restraints raised serious issues; (2) the
strength of CDA's showing of justifications; and (3) the consequences
of concluding that each of those showings was sufficient. For instance,
the Solicitor General's amicus brief in NCAA argued that a "plausible
efficiency justification" should prevent application of the per se rule.28 6
But the SG continued by observing that " [i] t may be that further examina-
tion will show that the proffered efficiency justification should be
rejected; in that event, the conduct can still be condemned as unreason-
able without completing a 'full' rule of reason analysis that includes
market definition and market power determinations. 287 Similarly, Profes-
sor Areeda, who was cited by a CDA amicus brief for suggesting that
defendants need show mere plausibility, 288 called for an early "quick
look" at a restraint's justification to see whether, usually based on the
arguments alone, the justification is "legitimate in principle and capable
of being proved satisfactorily." 289 This is a higher test than mere plausibil-
ity. More significant, a defendant who carries the day at this stage does
not win recourse to the kind of full-blown rule of reason the NCAA and
CDA were advocating. Rather, it has recourse to what Professor Areeda
contemplated as a rule of reason, which can feature presumptions about
restraints' severity, attention to less restrictive alternatives, and the like-
the sliding scale, not the Full Monty.290
215 See supra Part IV.A.3.
286 Supra text at note 157.
28 7Amicus Brief at 10; see also id. at 12-13 ("Where the practice at issue is shown to
pose high anticompetitive risks because, on its face, it restricts output or restrains price
competition, a court can and should address the above efficiency questions without con-
ducting a 'full' rule of reason analysis of market definition and market power. If at
any point it becomes clear that the collaborators have no viable, significant efficiency
justification, a facially suspect restraint can be condemned without further inquiry.")
(citation omitted).
288 NCAA Amicus Brief, supra note 157, at 16.
289 7 AREEDA, supra note 173, at 429.
290 It has been suggested that the antitrust rule of reason should mimic employment
discrimination cases involving employee discharges: after the plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case of discrimination, an employer must articulate a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its actions." This articulation shifts the burden back to the plaintiff to show
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F. THE PROBLEM WITH MERE PLAUSIBILITY: A LESSON
Ironically, CDA itself serves as a good illustration of the problem with
letting mere plausibility trigger the full-blown rule of reason. Recall how
easily the Supreme Court majority ruled that CDA had offered "plausible"
justifications for its restrictions: that CDA's rules stimulated advertising of
particular discounts so effectively that the gain in consumer information
outweighed the loss through prohibition of generalized claims of dis-
counts, and that CDA's ban on quality claims was the only way to prevent
false and deceptive advertising. 29 1 Yet this discussion of plausibility was
occurring, not at the start of a case, but at the end of six years of
active litigation.
that the articulated reasons are mere pretext. Howard H. Chang et al., Some Economic
Principles for Guiding Antitrust Policy TowardsJoint Ventures, 1998 COLUM. Bus. L. Rhv. 223,
280 & n.116 (citing BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAw 597-603 (2d ed. 1983)), summarized and relied upon, NCAA Amicus Brief, supra note
157, at 16 n.6.
The comparison to employment discrimination law actually serves to caution against
giving undue weight to a merely plausible antitrust justification. In employee discharge
discrimination cases, the plaintiffs initial burden is "not onerous." Texas Dep't of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). The plaintiff simply shows that he or
she is in a protected class, was discharged from a job for which he or she was qualified,
and was replaced by a person outside the protected group. 1 BARBARA LINDEMANN &
PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 847 (3d ed. 1996). The defendant's
burden is even lighter. Indeed, "an employer can almost always articulate a valid, objective
reason for the discharge." SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, 2D ED., supra, at 597; see also SCiLEI &
GROSSMAN, 3D ED., supra, at 853 ("Employers normally have little difficulty articulating a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. .. ."). This initial skirmishing merely sets the stage
for what disparate treatment employment discrimination is all about: disputing whether
those articulated reasons are a pretext concealing discrimination. Id. at 853-57.
A different structure is used for disparate impact employment discrimination litigation.
Here the plaintiff has the serious initial burden of showing that an employment policy
or practice has a significantly disproportionate adverse impact on a protected class. Id. at
89. The defendant then has correspondingly serious burdens of production and persuasion
to show that the policy or practice is justified as "'job-related for the position in question
and consistent with business necessity."' Id. at 87, 106-110 (quoting statute). Here, mere
plausibility will not do; this is not just stage setting. The essence of disparate impact
employment discrimination litigation is this dispute between proof of effect and proof
ofjustification. See generally Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A "Quota Bill,"
a Codification of Griggs, a Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 287 (1993). (Even if a defendant satisfies those burdens, a disparate-impact
plaintiff may still prevail by proving the existence of a satisfactory alternative policy or
practice without a discriminatory impact that the employer refuses to adopt. SCHLEI &
GROSSMAN, 3D ED. at 111-13.)
If employment discrimination litigation should provide a model for antitrust, one has
to choose which model. The plaintiff and defendant each could have light initial burdens,
which would leave the heavy lifting for a later stage. Alternatively, the plaintiff and defen-
dant each could be held to a more demanding standard. But one cannot reasonably
demand a substantial showing from the plaintiff, something trivial from the defendant,
and then something overwhelming from the plaintiff.
291 See supra Part III.
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When a case has been litigated as long as this one, when a defendant
has made as many different arguments as CDA had here, and when
even in a court of appeals, when there is record evidence about actual
practices, a defendant does not show how that evidence supports a
position (here, on the net effect of its restrictions), it is not unreasonable
for a court of appeals to note that the record appears to provide no
evidence to support a theory. When the record contains many advertise-
ments, and the defendant has discussed them without claiming that any
make specific, detailed pricing claims, the odds are strong that the point
was forgone because the advertisements do not make such claims. And
yet CDA won in the Supreme Court, in part, by persuading the Court
that its "net-increased-disclosure" argument was "plausible. ' 292 In terms
of future developments in the law, this outcome serves principally to
caution against making mere plausibility too outcome-determinative. 29 3
212 In the Court's defense, the Solicitor General (with the FTC) should have pointed
out the novelty of the justifications on which CDA was relying. For some reason (one can
speculate about the inevitable challenges when an agency and the SG's office jointly
prepare a brief), the SG did not adequately make this point. With respect to quality claims,
he merely pointed to a First Amendment case's teaching about the importance of making
government regulators distinguish the truthful from the false, and said that this "admoni-
tion is even more apt in the context of industry self-regulation." SG Brief, supra note 64,
at 42 (citing Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 478 (1988)). With respect to
the "net increased advertising of discounts" argument, the SG wrote as follows:
Petitioner nonetheless speculates (Br. 36) that its member dentists, even if effec-
tively (and reasonably) precluded from advertising across-the-board discounts by
its restrictions, should be able to comply with a requirement that advertised
discounts on individual services be accompanied by a litany of disclosures. The
Commission, however, exercising its expertise in the effects of advertising claims,
found that "the truthful offer of a discount from the price ordinarily charged
by a dentist for services is not deceptive." Pet. App. 85a. It also noted that
petitioner's restrictions went far beyond any restriction that would be necessary
to prevent dentists from engaging in "chicanery" such as selectively inflating the
price from which the discount is computed. Ibid.
Id. at n.28. Ironically, CDA complained about the Commission's failure to claim Chevron
deference to its assertion of jurisdiction until its Supreme Court merits brief, and wrote
that the Court was "entitled to ignore the Commission's belated embrace of this argument."
CDA Supreme Court Reply Brief, supra note 64, at 9. CDA cited Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S.
222, 228-29 (1994), where the Court observed that it "ordinarily do [es] not review claims
made for the first time in this Court." Indeed, the same month that the Court issued its
CDA opinion it declined to address an argument raised for the first time in an opposition
to certiorari. I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 119 S. Ct. 1439, 1449 (1999) (contention that there
were errors in translation).
29 Another source of caution is the confidence with which advocates in CDA pointed
to NCAA and !fD as, for instance, "prime examples of the type of conduct that qualifies
for 'quick look' review." NCAA Amicus Brief, supra note 157, at 8. The NCAA now states
that in the NCAA case, "colleges pooled their sales of televised football games in a way
that inevitably restricted output, and, by setting a single price scale for that restricted
output, effectively fixed prices as well." Id. at 9. When the NCAA case was before the Court,
however, that distinguished institution retained eminent counsel (Frank H. Easterbrook)
who argued that the challenged restraints must be judged under the full-blown rule of
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In CDA the Court found "plausible" arguments that had not been
seriously explored through litigation below. Indeed, on remand, CDA
has asked the Ninth Circuit for briefing on issues related to professional
advertising because "[t]he parties did not address these issues in their
briefs in this Court on the initial appeal .... -294 Since "plausibility" does
not have outcome-determinative consequences, this is a result that wastes
resources but is not a travesty. Had the Court ruled as requested, that
the plausibility of these arguments meant that the full-blown rule of
reason was required, the consequences would have been much more
serious. A full-blown rule of reason would have required Complaint
Counsel to pull out a map of California and begin dividing it into
carefully drawn, individualized geographic markets-an assignment so
daunting that they would have abandoned the effort untried. Because
the Court merely called for a "less quick look," Complaint Counsel and
CDA are free to examine the record evidence anew and find support or
lack thereof for the justifications the Court found "plausible."
G. THE ROLES OF THE FTC, THE COURT OF APPEALS,
AND THE SUPREME COURT
The CDA majority's opinion is eerily quiet about the Commission and
its opinion and findings. The last sentence is indicative of the Supreme
Court's intriguing focus only on the Ninth Circuit. "Because the Court
of Appeals did not scrutinize the assumption of relative anticompetitive
tendencies, we vacate the judgment and remand the case for a fuller
consideration of the issue" 295-not because the Commission erred in
the standard it applied, or the vigor of its scrutiny, but because the Ninth
Circuit did. Earlier, the majority explained that Justice Breyer's dissent
"contains much to impress on its own merits but little to demonstrate
the sufficiency of the Court of Appeals's review." Justice Souter wrote
that if the Ninth Circuit "engaged in a painstaking discussion in a league
reason because they improved quality and increased competition. Brief for the Petitioner,
NCAA. Had mere "plausibility" been the test, NCAA never would have passed. Similarly,
the American Dental Association argued in a CDA amicus brief that "[u]nlike the rules
at issue in those cases [NCAA and JFD], the ethical canons of the CDA are supported by
strong procompetitive justifications." ADA Amicus Brief, supra note 195, at 19 n.9. When
!FD was before the Court, however, that distinguished association argued that the Seventh
Circuit had correctly upheld the challenged rules under the full-blown rule of reason.
Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Dental Ass'n in Support of Respondent Indiana
Federation of Dentists. The point is not that there is anything improper about an entity
finding itself on the losing case and then attempting, in future litigation, to distinguish
that case. The changing perspectives serve only as a reminder of how easily a "plausibility"
test could be passed.
294 Motion of California Dental Association for A Briefing Schedule and for Oral Argu-
ment, No. 96-70409 (filed Oct. 22, 1999).
2 119 S. Ct. at 1618.
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withJustice Breyer's" and confronted the issue of verifiability, "its reason-
ing might have sufficed." But "[t] he obligation to give a more deliberate
look than a quick one does not arise at the door of this Court and should
not be satisfied here in the first instance."29 6
One would have thought that the Court might have shown more
interest in the Commission's decision. The CDA litigation has close paral-
lels to IndianaFederation ofDentists, where the Court, reversing the Seventh
Circuit, upheld the Commission's condemning of a dental association's
restraints without engaging in a full-blown rule of reason inquiry. In
Indiana Federation of Dentists the Court wrote at length about the Commis-
sion's opinion. Both of the CDA parties assumed that the Court would
closely examine the Commission's opinion. The SG's brief is replete with
references to the Commission's analysis and conclusions. The applicable
heading of this section of the brief is captioned "The Commission Cor-
rectly Concluded .... ," and its four subheadings each begin with "The
Commission." CDA, too, regularly discussed (critically) what the Commis-
sion had done, often linking the Commission's alleged sins with those
of the Ninth Circuit, 29 7 Yet the Court's opinion focuses almost exclusively
on the Ninth Circuit.
The Court's inattention to the Commission can be explained partly
by the unusually bright line that the court of appeals drew between the
"legal standard" it said it was applying (in its subheading A) and the
"substantial evidence" it evaluated (in its subheading B). 298 The Commis-
sion had pointed out to the Ninth Circuit that "almost all of CDA's
argument rests on CDA's disagreement with the Commission's fact find-
ing regarding the existence and effect of the restraints condemned," and
this fact finding was entitled to highly deferential "substantial evidence"
review.299 Although the Commission won the war in the Ninth Circuit,
it lost this important little battle. The Supreme Court majority blithely
noted that the court of appeals had "treated as distinct questions the
sufficiency of the analysis of anticompetitive effects and the substantiality
of the evidence supporting the Commission's conclusions," and said it
would limit itself to deciding that "the Court of Appeals erred when it
held as a matter of law that quick-look analysis was appropriate. '" 00
296 Id. at 1617.
217 E.g., CDA Supreme Court Brief, supra note 104, at 42-44; CDA Supreme Court Reply
Brief, supra note 64, at 14.
2 1 128 F.3d at 726, 728.
299 SG Brief, supra note 64, at 29-30.
300 119 S. Ct. at 1612.
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By declaring that it was considering only a legal issue, the Court was
freed from the normal obligation to examine the Commission's findings
of fact and the evidence supporting them. Under Chevron, scrutiny of a
legal issue usually would send a court back to examine whether the
agency had made a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute,
but the SG never claimed Chevron deference for the Commission's sub-
stantive determination (unlike its jurisdictional decision). This failure
is not surprising, since the questions presented to the Court did not
seem to raise the kind of classic issue of statutory interpretation for
which Chevron is applied.30 1 The Commission thus benefited from neither
"substantial evidence" nor Chevron deference. (In fact, the Supreme
Court spent much of its opinion discussing the nature and likely effect
of CDA's restrictions, which are factual issues to which a "substantial
evidence" standard should have been applied.30 2 )
The Ninth Circuit, which is famous for having problems in the
Supreme Court, somewhat invited this scrutiny by attempting to divide
law from fact. A Supreme Court that decides a minute percentage of
federal cases may at times act more as a manager of lower courts than
as a simple group of judges deciding a discrete case. Professor Strauss
has explained that a managerial Supreme Court would supervise the
courts of appeals to assure itself that key rules have been understood,
and not worry about the more particularized application of those rules.
30 3
A Supreme Court as manager might care more about whether the Ninth
Circuit is properly doing its job than about the particular intersection
of fact and law in this dispute, particularly where the Ninth Circuit has
conveniently identified a major disagreement as an issue of law.
A managerial Supreme Court ought to be careful before criticizing a
court of appeals for giving short shrift to an argument. The problem in
CDA was that, without reading the briefs at the Commission and Ninth
Circuit levels, the Court might not have appreciated (and did not appreci-
ate) the novelty of the justifications CDA was advancing. The acute irony
in this case is that the Ninth Circuit, having been chastised by the
Supreme Court for not spending enough time addressing CDA'sjustifi-
301 See supra note 41.
0 2 See, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp., 482 U.S. 27, 42 (1987); FCC v. Allentown
Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 364 (1955); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 493 (1951); Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 739 (1945) ("The weight to
be attributed to the facts proven or stipulated, and the inferences to be drawn from them,
are for the Commission to determine, not the courts." (citations omitted)); FTC v. A.E.
Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 758 (1945); Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381,
1385-86 (7th Cir. 1986).
101 Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's
Limited ResourcesforJudicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1118-22 (1987).
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cations, now confronts a request by CDA for briefing on some of those
justifications precisely because they were not briefed before.
In the future, it seems clear that Commission decisions will avoid the
term "quick look." Also clear is that any court of appeals that learns the
lessons of CDA will avoid forced divisions of law and fact. Any sliding
scale requires that the underlying facts and the intensity of review be
looked at simultaneously. This may be hard to accomplish in ajury trial,
but it plays to the Commission's unique role as an expert adjudicator. One
hopes that the next time an unusually accomplished FTC Commissioner
writes a major opinion that leads to Supreme Court review, the Commis-
sion opinion will not be oddly absent from the Court's opinion.
H. THE SLIDING SCALE: A FINAL COMMENT
The opinion and the experience of CDA have cautioned against the
mischief that can be caused by unthinking reliance on formulas. The
Court's opinion is an invitation to think, to learn, and to apply that
learning. °4
One has to worry that the sliding scale may sound better in theory
than it proves in practice. As early experience with the rule of reason
showed, if everything is relevant, nothing is dispositive. Decision formulas
have appeal both as a discipline to analysis and as roadmaps for litigation.
It is important for all concerned with the antitrust system that many
cases be capable of prompt resolution-and of being litigated practicably
in the courts as well as the Commission.
304 Many commentators have advocated sliding scales of one form or another. See, e.g.,
supra note 200; 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ch. 15 (1986 & Supp. (with Herbert
Hovenkamp)); Stephen Calkins, The October 1989 Supreme Court Term-and Antitrust: Power,
Access, and Legitimacy, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 339, 348-50 (1991); Thomas G. Krattenmaker,
Per Se Violations in Antitrust Law: Confusing Offenses with Defenses, 77 GEO. L.J. 165 (1988);
cf Thomas E. Kauper, The Sullivan Approach to Horizontal Restraints, 75 CALIF. L. Rv. 893,
905-08 & nn.70-71 (1987) (merit in a market power but not a market share screen; market
power should be inferable from conduct). Two of the more recent helpful contributions to
thinking about these issues are C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory
and Antitrust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1999), and Robert H. Lande & Howard P.
Marvel, Manipulating the Rules of Competition: A Third General Category of Collusion
(unpublished manuscript on file with author).
Subsequent to the drafting of this article, the FTC and the Antitrust Division issued for
comment Draft Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors (Oct. 1, 1999)
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9910/ointventureguidelines.htm>. Those draft Guidelines
retain a prominent role for the per se rule and a version of the rule of reason that
can be applied "without a detailed market analysis." Id. § 3.2-3. The draft has attracted
considerable attention and engendered some controversy. The antitrust agencies will have
to review with care the comments they receive as they consider whether the lines they are
drawing are sufficiently clear and helpful.
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Perhaps the ultimate irony of CDA is that litigants and lower courts
struggling to make the sliding scale operational may look to Justice
Breyer's dissenting opinion. He agreed with the majority that antitrust
should employ a sliding scale, which means that the Court is unanimous
on that point. But he explained that he would break the ultimate question
(whether restraints are anticompetitive) "into four classical, subsidiary
antitrust questions: (1) What is the specific restraint at issue? (2) What are
its likely anticompetitive effects? (3) Are there offsetting procompetitive
justifications? (4) Do the parties have sufficient market power to make
a difference?" 05
If we are not to ask whether restraints are "inherently suspect"; if we
are not to ask whether restraints merit a "quick look" (and I cannot
imagine that the FTC will soon employ the term in an adjudicated
opinion 0 6); if we are not to ask merely whether or not a restraint is per
se illegal; we must ask something. Justice Breyer's four questions may well
prove to be that something. It is noteworthy that he listed market power
last. In asking only whether there is "sufficient market power to make a
difference," he echoed the Commission itself:
Market power is part of a rule of reason analysis, but it is important to
remember why market power is examined. We consider market power to
help inform our understanding of the competitive effect of a restraint.
Where the consequences of a restraint are ambiguous, or where substan-
tial efficiencies flow from a restraint, a more detailed examination of
market power may be needed. 0 7
Where the consequences are clear or efficiencies are lacking, a more
rudimentary examination-well short of the Full Monty-should
prove sufficient.
"1 119 S. Ct. at 1618 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
506 Although the FTC/DOJ Draft Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Compet-
itors, supra note 304, retain a version of the rule of reason that can be applied "without
a detailed market analysis," the term "quick look" is conspicuously absent. But cf Robert
Pitofsky, FTC Chairman, Joint Venture Guidelines: Views from One of the Drafters,
Remarks Before ABA Section of Antitrust Law at 4 (Nov. 11-12, 1999) (draft Guidelines
reject an absolute market power screen "for purposes of quick look or for rule of reason
treatment") <http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/jvg991111.htm>.
"1 121 F.T.C. at 311.
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